

SIGAR

**Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction**

SIGAR 16-22 Inspection Report

Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015



**MARCH
2016**

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Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

WHAT SIGAR REVIEWED

Through September 30, 2015, Congress appropriated about \$109.6 billion for U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. The majority of funding, about \$69 billion or 62 percent, has been allocated to the Department of Defense (DOD), and DOD reported that about \$55.8 billion of those funds have been disbursed. DOD's reconstruction projects have been funded primarily through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and the Commander's Emergency Response Program.

Within Afghanistan, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) has responsibility for military operations, including DOD's reconstruction program. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), under USFOR-A's command, has responsibility for funding the country-wide building program to support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Air Force Civil Engineer Center (formerly the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment), and USFOR-A components were responsible for administering and overseeing most of DOD's reconstruction projects.

From July 2009 through September 2015, SIGAR issued 36 inspection reports examining DOD reconstruction projects. To develop this report, SIGAR reviewed each of the 36 reports, which involved 44 separate reconstruction projects with a combined contract value of about \$1.1 billion. These projects were located in 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces.

The objectives of this report were to analyze and identify common themes in

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Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015

SIGAR 16-22 INSPECTION REPORT

WHAT SIGAR FOUND

SIGAR found that 16 of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects it inspected from July 2009 through September 2015 met contract requirements and technical specifications. These projects show that when contractors adhere to requirements and there is adequate oversight, project goals can be achieved. The 28 remaining projects included work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. Deficiencies ranged from substituting building materials without approval to not completing work required under the contract. In some cases, these actions had health and safety implications. For example, 16 of the 28 projects that did not meet contract requirements included deficiencies so severe that they threatened the structural integrity of the buildings and the safety of the buildings' occupants. Bathkhak School in Kabul province had such serious design and construction flaws that SIGAR sent a safety alert letter to the Commander of USFOR-A, urging a delay in transferring the school to the Afghan government until these construction deficiencies could be addressed. SIGAR found that poor contractor performance and inadequate government oversight were the primary contributors to noncompliance with contract requirements.

The construction deficiencies SIGAR identified during its inspections involved such issues as collapsible soil due to poor compaction; improperly installed heating and cooling systems; inoperable water systems; inadequate testing of mechanical systems; electrical wiring that was not up to code; use of substandard building materials; poorly mixed, cured, and reinforced concrete; and improperly installed roofs. SIGAR also found that remedying construction deficiencies sometimes resulted in additional expenditures beyond the initial cost of the contracts.

For example, SIGAR reported that 4 months after completion in October 2012, buildings at the Afghan Special Police Training Center's dry fire range began to disintegrate. The disintegration of this nearly \$500,000 project was caused by Qesmatullah Nasrat Construction Company, an Afghan company, failing to adhere to contract requirements and international building standards, and using substandard materials. SIGAR also found that project was plagued by poor U.S. government oversight and the failure to hold the contractor accountable for correcting deficiencies before the warranty expired. Since the range's safety and sustainability were compromised, the Afghan government had to demolish and rebuild the dry fire range using its own funds.

Of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects inspected, SIGAR found that 21 were complete and 23 were incomplete at the time of our inspections. Of the 21 projects that were complete, 14 were being used and 7, or one-third of the completed projects, had never been used. SIGAR found that usage of the 14 projects varied with some project being fully used and others only partially used. For example, SIGAR reported that the Qala-i-Muslim medical clinic in Kabul province appeared to be a success story. However, SIGAR also found cases like Salang hospital in Parwan province where the staff were using only about 35

the findings from those 36 inspection reports. Specifically, SIGAR assessed the extent to which (1) contractors met contract requirements and technical specifications when constructing or renovating facilities; (2) the facilities inspected were being used; and (3) DOD has implemented recommendations made in the inspection reports. Because SIGAR's inspection reports contained numerous recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, this report contains no new recommendations.

USFOR-A and USACE provided written comments on a draft of this report. USFOR-A stated that this report's value lies in consolidating lessons that may benefit organizations charged with construction efforts in similar environments. USACE stated that it appreciated SIGAR's remarks that it promptly responded to 90 percent of the deficiencies noted in the 27 USACE reconstruction projects addressed in this report, and concurred that the life and safety issues SIGAR discovered during its inspections were troublesome. However, both USFOR-A and USACE commented that the projects SIGAR inspected were not representative of all reconstruction projects completed in Afghanistan, or of current projects.

large percentage of recommendations closed shows that in response to SIGAR's inspection reports, DOD generally took action to improve efficiency and effectiveness in its reconstruction activities, and to correct construction deficiencies. For example, USACE took immediate action at the Afghan National Army garrison in Gamberi to (1) remedy possible flooding by having drainage areas examined and repaired and having the contractor conduct frequent surveys for future deteriorating conditions, (2) repair a bridge near the garrison's main entrance that SIGAR believed could collapse under heavy traffic because its deck service had been compromised, and (3) design and plan for installing a perimeter fence that we said was needed to secure the garrison's weapons training range.

SIGAR's inspections have covered a wide range of DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, from bases for the ANDSF to schools and hospitals. While some of those projects were well built and met contract requirements and technical specifications, most of the projects SIGAR inspected did not meet those requirements and had serious construction deficiencies. In many cases, poorly prepared or unqualified contractor personnel, inferior materials, poor workmanship, and inadequate oversight by both the contractor and the U.S. government contributed to these substandard results. Unless future projects address the deficiencies SIGAR has identified by, for example, improving project planning and design, and oversight during the construction process, substandard projects will continue to be built, resulting in a waste of U.S. taxpayer funds.

percent of the hospital's square footage, and the hospital employed less than 20 percent of the expected staff.

Of the 23 incomplete projects, 6 projects were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion dates and, therefore, would not have been ready for use at the time SIGAR inspected them; 5 were incomplete due to project termination or for reasons SIGAR could not determine at the time of the inspections; and 12 were experiencing construction delays that had extended their completion past the original schedule. With respect to the 12 projects that were not completed on time due to construction delays, those delays ranged from 5 months to over 2 years and 7 months beyond their originally scheduled completion dates. Despite being incomplete, SIGAR noted that 7 of the 23 projects were being used to some extent at the time of our inspections.

DOD has taken steps to improve its processes to ensure control and accountability for its reconstruction projects, including hiring more engineers and changing its guidance to improve planning and oversight. For example, as soon as we informed USACE of the lack of water at the Afghan Border Police Base Lal Por 2 in Nangarhar province, USACE assembled a project development team to find a solution to the water supply. Further, USACE noted that in June 2011, it began mandating hydrogeologist reviews to assess the water supply as part of its site assessments. Despite DOD's efforts to improve processes, serious problems continued with its reconstruction projects. Construction of the three most troubled projects we inspected—the Afghan Special Police's Dry Fire Range, Bathkhak School, and the Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse—began in 2012 or long after we started reporting on systemic oversight weaknesses with DOD reconstruction projects. For example, we identified unapproved product substitution as a problem with both the dry fire range and the school, an issue we had raised in prior reports.

SIGAR determined that as of September 30, 2015, DOD had implemented the majority of recommendations made in its 36 inspection reports. In these reports, SIGAR made 95 recommendations to DOD, and of the 90 recommendations closed, DOD implemented 76, or 84 percent, of them. The



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March 11, 2016

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Secretary of Defense

General Lloyd J. Austin III
Commander, U.S. Central Command

General John W. Nicholson
Commander, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan and
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Commanding General and Chief of Engineers,
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Major General Gordon (Skip) B. Davis, Jr.
Commander, Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan

Mr. Randy E. Brown
Director of Staff
U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Center

This report analyzes and identifies common themes in the findings of the 36 inspection reports that SIGAR issued from July 2009 through September 2015 involving Department of Defense (DOD) reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. These 36 reports involved 44 projects that have a combined contract value of about \$1.1 billion. SIGAR's inspections generally assess the extent to which facilities and infrastructure built or renovated using reconstruction funds were constructed in accordance with contract requirements and applicable technical specifications, and are being used and maintained as intended. Depending on the outcomes, we may make recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction efforts.

For this report, we assessed the extent to which (1) contractors met contract requirements and technical specifications when constructing or renovating facilities; (2) the facilities were being used; and (3) DOD has implemented recommendations that we made in our prior inspection reports. We determined that 16 of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects we inspected from July 2009 through September 2015 met contract requirements, while the 28 remaining projects included work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. Deficiencies ranged from substituting building materials without approval to not completing work required under the contract.

In addition, of the 44 projects we inspected, 21 were complete and 23 were incomplete at the time of our inspections. Of the 21 projects that were complete, 14 were being used and 7, or one-third of the completed projects, had never been used. Of the 23 incomplete projects, 6 projects were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion dates and, therefore, would not have been ready for use at the time we inspected them; 5 were incomplete due to project termination or for reasons we could not determine at the time of our inspections; and 12 were experiencing construction delays that had extended their completion past



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the original schedule. Despite being incomplete, we noted that 7 of the 23 projects were being used to some extent at the time of our inspections. Finally, we found that of the 95 recommendations we made to DOD in the 36 inspection reports analyzed in this report, DOD had implemented 76 of them as of September 2015.

Our inspections have covered a wide range of DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, from bases for the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces to schools and hospitals. While some of those projects were well built and met contract requirements and technical specifications, most of the projects SIGAR inspected did not meet those requirements and had serious construction deficiencies. In many cases, poorly prepared or unqualified contractor personnel, inferior materials, poor workmanship, and inadequate oversight by both the contractor and the U.S. government contributed to these substandard results. Unless future projects address the deficiencies SIGAR has identified by, for example, improving project planning and design, and oversight during the construction process, substandard projects will continue to be built, resulting in a waste of U.S. taxpayer funds.

Because our inspection reports contained numerous recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, this report does not contain any new recommendations.

We received written comments on a draft of this report from U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), which are reproduced in appendices IV and V, respectively. USFOR-A stated that this report's value lies in consolidating lessons that may benefit organizations charged with construction efforts in similar environments. USACE stated that it appreciated SIGAR's remarks that it promptly responded to 90 percent of the deficiencies noted in the 27 USACE reconstruction projects addressed in this report, and concurred that the life and safety issues SIGAR discovered during its inspections were troublesome. However, both USFOR-A and USACE commented that the projects SIGAR inspected were not representative of all reconstruction projects completed in Afghanistan, or of current projects. USACE also provided some technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

SIGAR conducted this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFCEE	Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment
ANA	Afghan National Army
ANDSF	Afghan National Defense and Security Forces
ANP	Afghan National Police
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CSTC-A	Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan
DOD	Department of Defense
TFBSO	Task Force for Business and Stability Operations
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USFOR-A	U.S. Forces–Afghanistan

After the Taliban was driven from power in 2001, the United States, along with other coalition partners, initiated projects to help reconstruct Afghanistan, which had been devastated by nearly 30 years of conflict. Through September 30, 2015, Congress had appropriated about \$109.6 billion for reconstruction activities in Afghanistan.¹ The Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State, and the U.S. Agency for International Development have carried out most of those reconstruction activities.

This report analyzes and identifies common themes in the findings of the 36 inspection reports we issued from July 2009 through September 2015 involving DOD reconstruction projects.² The 36 reports involved 44 separate reconstruction projects with a combined value of about \$1.1 billion.³ As shown in figure 1, the projects were located in 15 of Afghanistan's 34 provinces, and consisted of 16 Afghan National Police (ANP) and 12 Afghan National Army (ANA) bases, 5 schools, 3 medical facilities, 3 incinerator locations, 2 storage facilities, 1 road, 1 bridge, and 1 electrical plant. It was not our intention to make any projections to the entire population of DOD reconstruction projects. However, our findings provide insight into the varying quality of the projects we inspected, thereby highlighting issues on which DOD should focus its quality assurance efforts in current and future construction projects.

Figure 1 - DOD Inspection Sites



Source: SIGAR analysis

Note: This map is not intended to show the exact location of the sites. It solely indicates the provinces in which the sites are located.

¹ From October 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015, Congress appropriated an additional \$3.5 billion for Afghanistan relief and reconstruction, for a total of about \$113.1 billion.

² We will be summarizing our inspection reports on the Department of State's and the U.S. Agency for International Development's reconstruction efforts in a subsequent report.

³ Several of our inspection reports cover the inspection of more than one project. For example, our October 2010 report on ANP facilities in Helmand and Kandahar provinces covers the inspection results of six separate projects (see SIGAR Audit 11-03, *ANP District Headquarters Facilities in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces Have Significant Construction Deficiencies Due to Lack of Oversight and Poor Contractor Performance*, October 27, 2010).

The objectives of this report were to assess the extent to which (1) contractors met contract requirements and technical specifications when constructing or renovating facilities; (2) the facilities inspected were being used; and (3) DOD has implemented recommendations that we made in the inspection reports. We conducted our work in Arlington, Virginia, from July 2015 through March 2016 in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. Appendix I contains a detailed discussion of our scope and methodology for this summary report. Appendix II lists the 36 inspection reports summarized in this report. Appendix III lists the inspection reports and information about whether the facilities were built as required and were being used.

BACKGROUND

Since 2001, two of DOD's reconstruction objectives in Afghanistan have been to (1) train, equip, base, and sustain the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), comprised of the ANA and ANP, and (2) respond to urgent humanitarian relief and small-scale reconstruction projects to support local Afghan communities.⁴ The majority of all U.S. reconstruction funding—about \$69 billion, or more than 62 percent, of the \$109.6 billion appropriated as of September 2015—has been allocated to DOD to accomplish these missions. DOD's reconstruction projects primarily have been funded through the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund (\$60.7 billion) and the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) (\$3.7 billion).⁵

Congress created the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to provide the ANDSF with equipment, supplies, services, training, and funding, as well as facility and infrastructure repair, renovation, and construction. Through September 30, 2015, DOD reported to SIGAR that about \$55.8 billion of the funds had been disbursed.⁶ In addition, DOD reported that the largest portion of funds disbursed from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund, or about \$22.7 billion, went to sustain the ANDSF. DOD also reported that through this same time period, it disbursed approximately \$5.6 billion from the Afghanistan Security Forces Fund to support infrastructure projects for the ANDSF. These projects included, among other things, military headquarters, barracks, schools and other training facilities, police checkpoint structures, airfields, and roads.

CERP was established in 2003 under the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq to enable military commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan.⁷ Congress has appropriated approximately \$3.7 billion for CERP in Afghanistan, and, as of September 30, 2015, DOD reported that about \$2.3 billion of those funds had been expended. CERP funds generally are intended for use on small-scale projects, which are estimated to cost less than \$500,000, though CERP funds have been spent on projects costing more than \$500,000. Program guidance restricts CERP to 20 authorized purposes, including electricity, transportation, education, healthcare, and water and sanitation projects. U.S. commanders have used CERP to fund projects in all 34 provinces in Afghanistan.

The U.S. Central Command is responsible for military activities in southwest Asia, and, therefore, has Afghanistan within its area of responsibility. Within Afghanistan, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan (USFOR-A) has overall responsibility for military operations, including DOD's reconstruction program. The Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A), under USFOR-A's command, has responsibility for funding the country-wide building program to support the national, regional, and district-level operations of the ANDSF. With regard to implementation, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) has been responsible for awarding contracts for and overseeing most of the reconstruction projects funded through the Afghanistan Security

⁴ The ANA and ANP were known collectively as the Afghan National Security Forces until 2015, when the name was changed to the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces.

⁵ DOD also received funding to support its reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan from several other sources, such as the Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund. Combined, the other sources of funding totaled \$4.7 billion through September 30, 2015.

⁶ SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, October 30, 2015.

⁷ The Coalition Provisional Authority was established as the transitional government of Iraq following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003.

Forces Fund. The Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE) also has awarded several reconstruction contracts.⁸ USFOR-A components, such as joint task forces and provincial reconstruction teams, have been involved in administering most of the contracts for and overseeing CERP-funded projects.⁹

SIGAR's Inspection Program

Congress created SIGAR in 2008 to help detect and deter waste, fraud, and abuse with U.S. reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. SIGAR began its inspections of DOD reconstruction projects in May 2009 and issued its first inspection report in July 2009.¹⁰ Our inspections are assessments of facilities and infrastructure built or renovated using reconstruction funds. Generally, our inspection objectives are to determine the extent to which (1) construction met contract requirements and technical specifications, and (2) facilities were being used. As part of this assessment, we determine, among other things, whether the facilities are structurally sound and completed on time and within budget. Depending on the outcomes, we may make recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of construction efforts. We have an established recommendation follow-up process with DOD to track the corrective actions taken or target dates for completing the corrective actions for each recommendation.¹¹

Prior to visiting a project site, our inspectors review project documents, including, when available, the construction contract, modifications to the contract, design drawings, applicable international and DOD building codes, and quality assurance and other oversight reports. Reviewing these documents helps to identify specific criteria for determining whether construction was performed according to contract requirements, and, if not, whether the responsible administering agency provided adequate project oversight. During the on-site visits, our inspectors focus on the quality of the construction and determine such things as whether the facilities are (1) in compliance with contract requirements and technical specifications, (2) structurally sound, (3) complete, and (4) being used. In addition to inspecting the facilities, when appropriate, inspectors obtain views about the project from contractors as well as U.S. and Afghan government officials.

In the majority of DOD reconstruction project inspections, we were able to visit the project site personally. However, security concerns on the ground sometimes limited our inspection teams' ability to conduct on-site project assessments. For example, in some cases, we had as little as 1 to 2 hours on site to perform our inspection because of security and other concerns. Further, because of the drawdown of U.S. forces, combined with the increase in insurgent activity, we were not able to reach some project locations to conduct a physical inspection. For example, our inspectors were scheduled to visit the Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility project site in Helmand province on two occasions in January and March 2014. Although the site was located within an area that allowed civilian visits when security conditions were deemed to be safe, both visit requests were denied.¹² International Security Assistance Force officials told us the requests were denied because that

⁸ AFCEE, the Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency, and the Air Force Real Property Agency merged to become the Air Force Civil Engineer Center on October 1, 2012. The three reports in this summary report referencing AFCEE were issued prior to the merger.

⁹ Provincial reconstruction teams were key instruments through which the international community delivered assistance at the provincial and district level. The U.S.-managed provincial reconstruction teams were interim organizations used to improve security, support good governance, and enhance provincial development.

¹⁰ SIGAR Inspection 09-01, *Inspection of Improvements to the Khowst City Electrical Power System: Safety and Sustainability Issues Were Not Adequately Addressed*, July 28, 2009.

¹¹ For a detailed explanation of SIGAR's recommendation follow-up process, see SIGAR 15-29-AR, *Department of Defense: More than 75 Percent of All SIGAR Audit and Inspection Report Recommendations Have Been Implemented*, January 15, 2015.

¹² U.S. military officials told us they would provide civilian access only to areas within a 1-hour round trip, using air assets, of an advanced medical facility. See SIGAR 14-4-SP, *Oversight Access Inquiry Letter to Department of Defense, Department of State and U.S. Agency for International Development*, October 10, 2013.

area had high insurgent activity and was unsafe to visit. Instead, we relied heavily on an extensive collection of contract and management documentation, including photos and site visit reports.

Our inspections were conducted under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Of the 36 inspections included in this report, 27 were completed in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The other 9 inspections were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The engineering assessments were conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*.

Impact of the Military Drawdown

With the drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces beginning in June 2011, significant portions of Afghanistan became inaccessible to SIGAR and other agencies conducting oversight of reconstruction activities, as well as the agencies implementing reconstruction efforts. As an alternative means for conducting oversight, due to a limited ability to travel within Afghanistan, in December 2014, we entered into an agreement with vetted and well-trained Afghan civil society partners to assist us with our inspections. These partners conduct site visits and engineering assessments of various reconstruction projects on our behalf and report back to us on the results.

MORE THAN 60 PERCENT OF THE DOD RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS THAT SIGAR INSPECTED DID NOT FULLY MEET CONTRACT REQUIREMENTS OR TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS

Of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects we inspected from July 2009 through September 2015, 16 met contract requirements and technical specifications. The 28 remaining projects had construction work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. Noncompliance ranged from substituting building materials without approval to not completing work required under the contract. In some cases, these actions had health and safety concerns associated with them. Sixteen projects contained deficiencies so severe that they threatened the structural integrity of the buildings and the safety of their occupants. For example, the design and construction flaws of the Bathkhak School in Kabul province were so serious and potentially life threatening that we sent a safety alert letter to the Commander of USFOR-A, urging a delay in the transfer of the newly constructed school buildings to the Afghan government until our inspection report was issued and the Commander could take action to address the full set of concerns discussed in the report.¹³ We found that poor contractor performance and inadequate government oversight were the primary contributors to nonadherence to contract requirements and technical specifications.

Examples of DOD Reconstruction Projects that Met Contract Requirements and Technical Specifications

We determined that 16 of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects we inspected met contract requirements and technical specifications. These projects show that when contractors adhere to requirements and there is adequate oversight, high-quality projects can be the result. In addition, Afghan support can have a positive impact on the outcome of a project. The following are two examples of projects in which contractors followed the requirements and technical specifications, and built good facilities.

¹³ SIGAR SP-13-5, *Safety Alert Letter: Bathkhak School*, June 21, 2013.

SIGAR 14-82-IP, Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility: Quality of Construction Appears To Be Good, but the Facility Has Not Been Used to Date, July 16, 2014

We reported that the \$2.89 million Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility located in Helmand province was well constructed. The quality of construction for this USACE-administered contract can be attributed to Afghan quality assurance personnel being on site for part of the project, USACE engineers and quality assurance personnel making multiple oversight visits, and USACE holding the contractor accountable for correcting construction deficiencies. For example, USACE made 23 site visits during construction and sent the contractor 26 letters, many of which expressed concerns regarding scheduling and construction delays. On the DD Form 1354, USACE listed several construction deficiencies associated with the storage facility, including installing and painting steel shelving in the cold storage rooms.¹⁴ USACE and others provided us photographs and documents showing that the contractor corrected all of the deficiencies. Even though the facility was well built, at the time we issued our July 2014 report, or 10 months after it was transferred to the Afghan government, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry was still seeking private investors to lease the storage facility.

SIGAR Inspection 09-02, Inspection of Mahmood Ragi to Nijrab Road Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met; but Sustainability Concerns Exist, October 2, 2009

Our inspection of this \$6.6 million project to build a 28.5-kilometer road did not disclose any shortcomings in the Afghan contractor's compliance with contract requirements, including project design, schedule, cost, and quality. We found that the project, administered by the Kapisa provincial reconstruction team, was on schedule, and the contractor was adhering to Afghan road construction standards to grade and widen the road to meet alignment and road width requirements. For example, the contractor was required to place an asphalt base course along the road of 6 centimeters thick and 7 meters wide in accordance with the Afghan Ministry of Public Works' road construction standards. We spot-checked the base course construction in three places and found that the thickness and width conformed to the standards. In another example, the contractor was responsible for repairing, constructing, or extending 58 culverts along the road, as well as repairing and resurfacing five existing bridges and constructing a new 16-meter-long bridge.¹⁵ We determined that the level of workmanship was adequate and found no major deficiencies in the design or construction of the culverts or bridge work. However, we did question the project's sustainability due to the demands that would be placed on the road and the inability of the local Afghan authorities to maintain improved roads due to a lack of proper equipment, material, personnel, and expertise.¹⁶

Examples of DOD Reconstruction Projects that Did Not Meet Contract Requirements or Technical Specifications

Twenty-eight of the 44 projects we inspected had construction work that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications. The deficiencies we found during these inspections were widespread and generally fit into three categories:

1. Soil issues, including inadequate site preparation and collapsible soil due to poor grading
2. Systems problems related but not limited to electrical, water, and sewer distribution, including improperly installed heating, cooling, and ventilation systems; inoperable water systems; improper testing and commissioning of mechanical systems; and non-code-compliant electrical wiring
3. Structural problems, such as the use of substandard, inadequate, and irregular building materials; poorly mixed, cured, and reinforced concrete; and improperly installed roofs, which led to leaks.

¹⁴ DD Form 1354 is used in connection with the transfer of military real property between the military departments and other government agencies.

¹⁵ A culvert is a structure that allows water to flow under a road from one side to the other, and can be made from a pipe, reinforced concrete, or other material.

¹⁶ In May 2015, SIGAR initiated a performance audit to examine the sustainability of DOD- and U.S. Agency of International Development-constructed roads in Afghanistan.

The following are examples of projects where we found that the contractors did not adhere to contract requirements or technical specifications. The types of problems described in these examples are generally representative of the problems we found with other DOD reconstruction projects we inspected that did not meet contract requirements or technical specifications.

SIGAR 15-27-IP, *Afghan Special Police Training Center's Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Performance and Poor Government Oversight Led to Project Failure*, January 13, 2015

We reported that within 4 months of completion, the Afghan Special Police Training Center's dry fire range buildings began to disintegrate. This nearly \$500,000 project in Wardak province was administered by the Regional Contracting Center at Forward Operating Base Shank. Photo 1 shows the disintegration of one of the buildings. This disintegration or "melting" was caused by Qesmatullah Nasrat Construction Company, an Afghan firm, failing to adhere to contract requirements and international building standards, and using substandard materials. We also found that construction was plagued by poor government oversight throughout all phases of the project. Specifically, the contracting officer's representatives failed to identify any construction deficiencies. Further, despite the deficiencies, the Regional Contracting Center accepted the facilities and failed to hold the contractor fully accountable for correcting those deficiencies before the contract warranty expired. As a result, the range's safety and long-term sustainability were compromised. The Afghan government had to demolish and rebuild the dry fire range using its own funds, resulting in a waste of U.S. taxpayers' money.

**Photo 1 - Exterior View of Building
Deterioration Due to Water Penetration**



Source: Special Police Training Center, February 2013

SIGAR Inspection 13-10, *Bathkhak School: Unauthorized Contract Design Changes and Poor Construction Could Compromise Structural Integrity*, July 24, 2013

We reported that the Bathkhak School facility, which was under construction in Kabul province at the time of our inspection in 2013, was not being constructed in accordance with contract requirements. For example, instead of a single-story, 10-classroom building, we found two 5-classroom buildings were being built under this USFOR-A-administered project. We also found that the contractor substituted building materials without USFOR-A approval. In one instance, a concrete slab roof was installed instead of a wood-trussed roof, as required by the contract. This raised concerns because the school, which was to be occupied by hundreds of faculty and students, was located in an area of high seismic activity. Further, we found that the school appeared to have construction flaws that could compromise its structural integrity. For example, we found (1) large gaps between bricks in the walls that supported the concrete roof (see example in photo 2);

**Photo 2 - School Building's Exterior Brick Wall
with Gaps in Mortar**



Source: SIGAR, January 20, 2013

(2) walls that did not appear to be reinforced; and (3) honeycombing, exposed rebar, and concrete form boards remaining in the concrete slab roof.¹⁷ We also found that USFOR-A did not make its first oversight visit to the project site until 6 months after construction began. At that time, the school was 70 percent complete.

Responding to a draft of our inspection report, USFOR-A ordered personnel to have the contractor fix the deficiencies under warranty; however, the unauthorized concrete roof remained an uncorrected problem. USFOR-A's response stated that "a licensed structural engineer from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers performed a building structural assessment to include test and analysis for determination of the structural integrity of the building. The engineer determined that the ceiling reinforcing may be inadequate and should be monitored for any future cracks." The response also stated that U.S. officials would meet with Afghan authorities to see whether they would accept the risk of the school structure "as is" and, if so, would advise them to monitor the school for cracks.

SIGAR Audit-12-02, *Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center, October 26, 2011*

We reported that the Kabul Military Training Center experienced cost growth and schedule delays due to a variety of factors, including poor contractor performance and security issues. For example, Phase I and Phase II construction were completed 1.5 years and 2 years late, respectively. Oversight weaknesses contributed to these delays, which were not unique at the time, as AFCEE data showed that the majority of its projects in Afghanistan—80 percent—experienced similar delays. Further, although electrical problems were identified at the training center in June 2008, AFCEE did not address the problems until five fires occurred in four separate buildings at the end of that year.

In January 2009, AFCEE's contracting officer wrote that visual inspections indicated there were serious electrical problems in multiple facilities, two of which housed about 600 ANA soldiers each. Two key factors contributed to the electrical problems: (1) acceleration of the construction schedule without a commensurate increase in oversight, and (2) the use of substandard and counterfeit materials. In addition to the wiring not being compliant with the National Electrical Code, as the contract required, the AFCEE contracting officer stated that the level of craftsmanship was completely unacceptable.

¹⁷ Honeycombing is evidence of poor concrete consolidation, which can be caused by such things as too dry a mix or inadequate vibration during pouring of the concrete, leaving air bubbles in the concrete mix. Depending on the location of these defects, honeycombing can weaken the structure significantly. Similarly, exposed rebar will rust eventually and compromise the integrity of the concrete, and cause it to fail.

SIGAR Audit 11-03, ANP District Headquarters Facilities in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces Have Significant Construction Deficiencies Due to Lack of Oversight and Poor Contractor Performance, October 27, 2010

In October 2010, we reported that construction at each of the six district headquarters being built under a \$5.9 million USACE-administered project failed to meet contract and construction requirements. We found that the level of noncompliance at each site varied, but overall the construction was poor. Photo 3 shows stairs at the Garm Ser project site that are different heights and crumbling. Deficiencies identified were both extensive and unacceptable from a structural and safety standpoint. Problem areas included low-quality concrete and inadequate roofing installations. For example, inadequate concrete and foundation work called into question the structural integrity of the buildings and raised the risk of collapse. Most significantly, we observed structural issues that cast doubt on the facilities' ability to withstand an earthquake, as required by the contract. We also found numerous cases of product substitution in which lower-grade materials were used instead of the quality specified in the contract. For example, poor-quality residential-grade windows were used instead of the commercial-grade windows that are thermally insulated and tempered. Due to poor contractor performance and USACE's failure to implement its own quality assurance procedures, we concluded that the U.S. government might be responsible for \$1 million in repair costs to address the construction deficiencies we identified during our inspection.¹⁸

Photo 3 - Stairs of Different Heights and Crumbling at Garm Ser Site




Source: SIGAR, June 27, 2010

SIGAR Audit 10-09, ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements: Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed, April 20, 2010

In 2010, we reported that several structures at the ANA garrison in Kunduz were unsafe, uninhabitable, or unusable. The structures were being built under a \$72.8 million contract administered by USACE. We observed severe ground settlement, roadbed cavities, and improper soil grading. We noted that the probable cause of these issues was a lack of adequate soil preparation and pointed out that soil problems were well known in the area. For example, German forces built a camp nearby and used soil replacement, elevated building pads, and drainage systems to counter the risk of collapsible soil. Our report stated, "To protect U.S. investment in the garrison and provide a functioning center for ANA troops currently housed in tents outside the garrison, the issues we observed—most critically, the soil settling and site grading—need to be addressed." However, in a 2012 follow-up inspection, we found that soil instability and structural failure of facilities continued to occur, with ANA soldiers now living on the compound. For example, we found a latrine building that had settled and cracked, and was unusable

Photo 4 - Cracked Exterior of Latrine Building at ANA Garrison in Kunduz



Source: SIGAR, March 25, 2012

¹⁸ Also see SIGAR 14-13-IP, *Forward Operating Base Sharana: Poor Planning and Construction Resulted in \$5.4 Million Spent for Inoperable Incinerators and Continued Use of Open-Air Burn Pits*, December 16, 2013. We reported that Fluor, the base contractor responsible for operating the incinerator system upon completion, found numerous electrical deficiencies during an inspection that it estimated would cost \$1 million to repair. Base officials decided not to operate the incinerators because of the high cost to correct the deficiencies.

(see photo 4). USACE officials attributed it to water infiltration underneath the building. An adjacent barracks was beginning to settle and was at risk of structural failure. We also found a sinkhole and pooled storm water putting the concrete pad for a transformer that provided much of the base's power at risk of structural failure.

DOD Worked to Improve Its Oversight Processes, but Problems Continued

DOD established procedures and worked to improve its existing processes to ensure control and accountability for both its Afghanistan Security Forces Fund and CERP-funded projects. For example:

- As soon as we informed USACE of the lack of water at the Afghan Border Police Base Lal Por 2, it assembled a project development team to find a solution to the water supply issue.¹⁹ The lack of water had prevented Lal Por 2 from being used. More importantly, USACE noted that in June 2011, it began mandating hydrogeologist reviews to assess the water supply as part of its site assessments.
- In 2012, USACE issued a new policy for the certification and training of contracting officer's representatives, particularly to emphasize the importance of documentation in their files. Multiple SIGAR reports had identified missing contract and project documentation as a problem, and one that affected our ability to perform complete and thorough audits and inspections.
- USFOR-A stated in comments to our Abdul Manan School inspection report in 2009 that provincial reconstruction teams without engineer and construction inspectors drawn from military organizations should not be allowed to conduct construction-related CERP initiatives.²⁰ This was to try to prevent the situation that USFOR-A noted in response to our inspection of the nearby Farukh Shah School: "Every effort is made to provide a quality project to the Afghans. However, the reality of the situation is that CERP projects are prepared by soldiers and not engineering firms."

Despite DOD's attention to establishing procedures and improving existing processes, serious problems continued with its reconstruction projects. For example, CSTC-A acknowledged that in 2009, it "only had about thirty personnel to manage the program, a clearly insufficient number to both plan and execute." However, CSTC-A added that it had taken, and continued to take, multiple actions to improve required oversight, including obtaining more personnel to do it.²¹ CSTC-A stated that it had begun to expand its engineering staff from 30 in 2010 to 96 in 2011, and was trying to secure an additional 66 engineers. In addition, the command noted changes in management and contracting guidance designed to improve planning and oversight. Yet, three of the most troubled sites in our inspection inventory involved projects that began years after we started reporting on systemic oversight weaknesses with DOD reconstruction projects. Specifically, the Afghan Special Police's Dry Fire Range, Bathkhak school, and ANA slaughterhouse were all started in 2012. For example, we identified unapproved product substitution as a problem with both the dry fire range and the school, an issue we had raised in prior reports. SIGAR's July 2013 quarterly report to Congress stated that "Investigations, along with SIGAR's audits, inspections, and special projects, highlight serious shortcomings in U.S. oversight of contracts: poor planning, delayed or inadequate inspections, insufficient documentation, dubious decisions, and—perhaps most troubling—a pervasive lack of accountability."^{22, 23}

¹⁹ SIGAR Inspection 12-01, *Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put \$19 Million Investment at Risk*, July 30, 2012.

²⁰ SIGAR Inspection 10-02, *Inspection of Abdul Manan Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Insufficient Planning, Safety Problems, and Poor Quality Control Affect Project Results*, October 26, 2009.

²¹ SIGAR Audit 11-6, *Inadequate Planning for ANSF Facilities Increases Risk for \$11.4 Billion Program*, January 26, 2011.

²² See SIGAR, *Quarterly Report to the United States Congress*, July 30, 2013.

²³ The DOD Inspector General found similar recurring problems in construction for the U.S. military (see DODIG-2015-059, *Military Construction in a Contingency Environment: Summary of Weaknesses Identified in Reports Issued From January 1, 2008, Through March 31, 2014*, January 9, 2015).

AT THE TIME OF SIGAR'S INSPECTION, ONE-THIRD OF THE 21 COMPLETED PROJECTS WERE NOT BEING USED, AND 23 PROJECTS WERE INCOMPLETE

Of the 44 DOD reconstruction projects that we inspected through September 2015, 21 were complete and 23 were incomplete at the time of our inspections. Of the 21 projects that were complete, 14 were being used and 7, or one-third of the completed projects, had never been used. We found that usage of the 14 projects varied with some projects being fully used and others only partially used. Of the 23 incomplete projects, 6 projects were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion dates and, therefore, would not have been ready for use at the time we inspected them; 5 were incomplete due to project termination or for reasons we could not determine at the time of our inspections; and 12 were experiencing construction delays that had extended their completion past the original schedule. For the 12 projects experiencing construction delays, we determined that at the time we inspected them, the delays ranged from 5 months to over 2 years and 7 months beyond the projects' originally scheduled completion dates. The primary factors contributing to delays included poor contractor performance, insurgent activity, inclement weather, and contract modifications, as well as inadequate planning and oversight. Despite being incomplete, we noted that 7 of the 23 projects were being used to some extent at the time of our inspections.

In 2012, DOD, to its credit, decided to reduce construction plans for ANDSF facilities for a variety of reasons, including the nonuse and underutilization of existing facilities, as well as the drawdown of U.S. military and coalition forces anticipated by the end of 2014.²⁴ For example, in April 2012, the International Security Assistance Force created the Operational Basing Board, which was expected to meet weekly to review and nominate existing U.S. and coalition facilities for closure or transfer to the Afghan government. As a result, through December 2012, the coalition closed 235 facilities and transferred 352 other facilities to the ANDSF. According to CSTC-A, transferring these existing coalition facilities to the ANDSF helped eliminate the need to construct 318 new ANDSF facilities and decreased costs by approximately \$2 billion.

Our September 2013 audit report addressing ANDSF facility planning identified 52 additional projects that might not meet the International Security Assistance Force's construction deadline, which was tied to the drawdown of U.S. and coalition forces anticipated by the end of 2014.²⁴ As a result, we recommended further planning and action to reduce waste in \$4.7 billion worth of planned and ongoing construction. Our conclusion noted, "DOD is building these facilities without knowledge of current utilization and the Afghan government's ability to sustain them. We have previously reported that current facilities are underutilized or not being used at all, and have repeatedly questioned the ANDSF's ability to operate and maintain these facilities." Two months later, in November 2013, the International Security Assistance Force issued a fragmentary order to reduce the size of the ANDSF infrastructure inventory by terminating, de-scoping, or offsetting ongoing construction projects less than 50 percent complete, giving the Afghan government a better chance of sustaining the remaining facilities.²⁵ As noted in our 2015 audit report on the status of our recommendations to DOD, this resulted in DOD discontinuing construction on all or part of 101 projects, achieving estimated cost savings of up to \$800 million.²⁶

²⁴ SIGAR Audit 13-18, *Afghan National Security Forces: Additional Action Needed to Reduce Waste in \$4.7 Billion Worth of Planned and Ongoing Construction Projects*, September 13, 2013. U.S. and coalition forces transferred security responsibility to the Afghan government at the end 2014. Leading up to this transition, those forces began to reduce their presence in Afghanistan. Because of this reduced U.S. and coalition presence, the International Security Assistance Force issued guidance requiring that all remaining ANDSF construction projects be completed by December 2014.

²⁵ International Security Assistance Force Fragmentary Order 215-2013, November 2013.

²⁶ SIGAR 15-29-AR, *Department of Defense: More than 75 Percent of All SIGAR Audit and Inspection Report Recommendations Have Been Implemented*, January 15, 2015.

Completed Projects

At the time of our inspections, we found that 21 projects were complete. Of those, 14 projects were being used, though the extent of usage varied by project. In some cases, the facilities were being fully used, such as the Qala-i-Muslim medical clinic; in other cases, we found the facilities were completed but were only partially being used, such as Salang hospital and Iman Sahib Border Police Headquarters. The remaining 7 completed projects had never been used. The following are examples of projects that were completed.

Completed Projects Being Used

SIGAR Inspection 13-07, *Qala-i-Muslim Medical Clinic: Serving the Community Well, But Construction Quality Could Not Be Fully Assessed, April 17, 2013*

We reported that Qala-i-Muslim medical clinic in Kabul province, built with CERP funds and administered by Joint Task Force-Kabul, appeared to be a success story. The community of 4,000 people supported the clinic's construction, a villager donated the land, and the facilities were being used on a daily basis. The clinic director told us that the clinic was serving between 200 and 300 patients per month. At the time of our January 2013 inspection, records showed 1,565 outpatient consultations, 63 prenatal patients, and 63 newborn deliveries since the clinic opened in September 2011.

We did not observe any major deficiencies, and our inspection found that the clinic had working heat, electrical, and water systems; floors were clean; medical staffing was good; bedding was plentiful and well kept; and the separate pharmacy building was well stocked. Photo 5 shows a postnatal room. Our report also noted that the Ministry of Public Health had signed an agreement as part of the approval process to sustain the clinic upon completion and that it had fulfilled its commitment to do so, and should be commended for it.

Photo 5 - Postnatal Room at Qala-i-Muslim Medical Clinic



Source: SIGAR, January 23, 2013

SIGAR 14-31-IP, *Salang Hospital: Lack of Water and Power Severely Limits Hospital Services, and Major Construction Deficiencies Raise Safety Concerns, January 29, 2014*

We reported that Salang hospital in Parwan province, built under a Regional Contracting Center-Bagram-administered contract, was functioning more as a medical clinic than as a hospital. Although the hospital was being used, it was not providing many of the services that it was intended to provide; the hospital staff were only using about 35 percent of the square footage of the constructed facility; and the hospital employed less than 20 percent of the staff it was expected to employ. According to the doctors and nurses on site during our inspection, the limited use—due primarily to the lack of electricity, water, furniture, and equipment—had prevented them from providing optimal medical care. For example, because there was no clean water, hospital staff were washing newborns with untreated river water. In another example, since the required solar panel system had not been provided, hospital staff were paying the equivalent of about \$18 a month of their own money to a neighbor to provide enough electricity to operate one light bulb in each of three hospital rooms. Despite these and other serious construction deficiencies found during our inspection, the contractor was paid the full amount of the contract—more than \$500,000.

SIGAR Inspection 13-05, Iman Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: \$7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused, January 29, 2013

We reported that this \$7.3 million Afghan Border Police facility, built under a USACE-administered contract, was being used; however, at the time of our inspection, there were only about 12 police personnel at the base that was built for 175 personnel. Our inspection was limited to 3 of the base's 12 buildings because most buildings were locked, and on-site personnel did not have keys. However, most of the buildings appeared to be unused. We did not identify any major construction quality issues with the three buildings that we inspected. In it comments on a draft of our report, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan/CSTC-A stated that the low occupancy rate was due to a change in ANP staffing requirements from 175 personnel for a combined battalion and company headquarters at the time the facility was planned to a 59-person company headquarters by the time the facility was completed—a span of about 2 years.

Completed Projects Never Used

SIGAR 14-10-IP, Walayatti Medical Clinic: Facility Was Not Constructed According to Design Specifications and Has Never Been Used, October 30, 2013

We reported that more than 20 months after the Walayatti medical clinic had been completed, it had never been used. At the time of our 2013 inspection, the clinic, built under a Joint Task Force-Kabul-administered contract, had no medical equipment and had not been staffed. Further, there was no evidence that the clinic had been properly transferred to the Afghan government or that the Ministry of Public Health planned to supply equipment for or staff the clinic. A ministry official told us that the clinic was not included in its operation and maintenance plan because the U.S. government had failed to coordinate with the Ministry of Public Health's Policy and Planning Directorate, and had not officially transferred the facility to the Afghan government. The project files contained no documentation of the clinic's transfer to the Afghan government after construction was completed.

SIGAR 14-82-IP, Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility: Quality of Construction Appears To Be Good, but the Facility Has Not Been Used to Date, July 16, 2014

We reported that the Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility in Helmand province—a \$2.89 million facility funded by DOD's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) and built under a USACE-administered contract—had been completed and was well constructed, but had never been used and was not being maintained. Construction was completed in May 2013, and the storage facility was transferred to the Afghan government in September 2013. The completed facility contained about 10,000 square feet of cold storage and 13,000 square feet of dry storage. However, TFBSO did not achieve what it told us was the key to the project's success—the operation, maintenance, and control of the facility by an Afghan business.

TFBSO found a distribution and juice production company, Omaid Bahar, Ltd., which was interested in expanding its activities into Helmand province. The task force discussed the facility's use with other investors, but determined that Omaid Bahar, Ltd. had the most comprehensive plan for using it. However, the company suffered damage to its Kabul cold storage facility, and planned repair expenditures kept it from expanding operations at the Gereshk site. Although several other investors subsequently expressed an interest in the facility, deals were never reached. According to TFBSO officials, the investors told them that the Afghan district governor was asking for money from the investors before leasing the property. The Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industry was continuing to look for private-sector investors.

Incomplete Projects

Of the 23 projects that were incomplete at the time of our inspection, 6 projects were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion dates and, therefore, would not have been ready for use at the time we inspected them. These were the Habib Rahman Secondary School, the Kohi Girls' School, the Tojg Bridge, the ANA garrison at Gamberi, the ANP Main Road Security Company, and the Bathkhak School. Five

projects were incomplete due to project termination or for reasons we could not determine at the time of our inspections. For example, the ANA slaughterhouse project was terminated before completion. The 12 remaining projects were experiencing construction delays that had extended their completion past the original schedule. Seven of the 23 projects were being used to some extent at the time of our inspections. For example, despite being incomplete, ANA personnel were using the ANA garrison at Kunduz.

Incomplete Projects Experiencing Delays

As noted, with respect to the 12 projects experiencing construction delays at the time of our inspections, we found that the delays ranged from 5 months to over 2 years and 7 months beyond the projects' originally scheduled completion dates. For example, the ANP provincial headquarters in Kunduz was not complete and was experiencing construction delays of about 1 year at the time of our on-site inspection. Construction delays have not been uncommon with reconstruction activities in Afghanistan. For example, we reported in our review of construction at the Kabul Military Training Center that about 80 percent of all AFCEE's construction projects for CSTC-A experienced schedule delays.²⁷ Although AFCEE has since taken corrective action, between 2006 and 2010, our review of AFCEE data showed that 33 of 41 AFCEE construction projects for CSTC-A were delayed. The delays, caused by a variety of factors including contractor performance problems, ranged from 1 month to 2 years, and averaged 10 months. The following are examples of the projects that were experiencing completion delays when we inspected them.

SIGAR Audit-10-10, ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed, April 30, 2010

We reported that two of the three construction phases for the \$129.8 million ANA garrison at Gamberi, built under a USACE-administered contract, were ongoing and had not met their originally scheduled completion dates at the time of our inspection. At the time of our inspection, Phase I was estimated to be completed about 2 years after the originally scheduled completion date, while Phase II was estimated to be completed about 1 year after its originally scheduled completion date. The contractor, DynCorp International, received two unsatisfactory ratings associated with these delays. For example, the Phase I unsatisfactory rating stated that DynCorp did not manage key personnel changes to ensure continuity, including when it replaced one program and two project managers. In addition, DynCorp was cited for failing to properly manage, control, and coordinate with subcontractors. DynCorp also failed to replace subcontractors before they were terminated, which further delayed the project. DynCorp acknowledged that it did not effectively manage Phase 1 of the contract. For Phase II, DynCorp was unable to commit sufficient resources and personnel to the project, and, similar to what happened in Phase I, DynCorp failed to adequately locate and manage a sufficient number of subcontractors to commence work. In response to our report, DynCorp took corrective action to address these issues, including implementing a new subcontracting plan and new process to ensure that subcontractors were qualified to perform the work.

SIGAR Inspection 13-4, Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns Remain About the Facility's Usability and Sustainability, January 24, 2013

We reported that this \$12.4 million project was originally scheduled to be completed in September 2012 but was about 1 year behind schedule at the time of our on-site inspection. We found that soon after USACE awarded the contract, the contractor began to have problems with collapsible soil conditions and sink holes on the project site. As a result, construction work was placed on hold until a \$5 million contract modification was executed to remediate the collapsible soil risk by requiring the contractor to over-excavate the building pads by 3 meters and then bring in certified backfill material as replacement soil. This process delayed construction progress by approximately 10 months. It was unclear why USACE did not address the potential for collapsible soil as part of the contract award since the soil condition was endemic to the area. For example, we noted a similar problem in an April 2010 report and an October 2012 report when a USACE contractor at an ANA

²⁷ SIGAR Audit 12-02, *Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center*, October 26, 2011.

garrison in the same general area of Kunduz province had failed to identify serious collapsible soil problems in its geotechnical report.²⁸

DOD HAS IMPLEMENTED THE MAJORITY OF RECOMMENDATIONS MADE IN SIGAR INSPECTION REPORTS COVERING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS

We made 95 recommendations to DOD in our 36 inspection reports issued from July 2009 through September 2015. Through September 30, 2015, we had closed 90, or about 95 percent, of those recommendations. Of those 90 recommendations, DOD implemented 76, or about 84 percent. Although DOD did not implement the 14 remaining recommendations, we closed these recommendations because (1) DOD did not concur with the recommendation or took no action on the recommendation, and we believed no further action would be taken; (2) DOD did not take timely action, which rendered the recommendation moot; or (3) planned work superseded the recommendations. As of September 30, 2015, 5 recommendations remained open. We made all 5 of these open recommendations to U.S. Central Command subordinate commands. As part of our follow-up process, we will continue to monitor the open recommendations to determine whether DOD is taking appropriate steps to implement the recommendations.²⁹

The large percentage of recommendations implemented shows that DOD generally was responsive to taking action to improve the efficiency and effectiveness in its reconstruction activities and to correct construction deficiencies. The following are some examples of specific actions that DOD took in response to our recommendations.

- USACE agreed with our findings that all three Afghan Border Police bases in Nangarhar province that we inspected had deficiencies, including critical water supply and septic and sewage system deficiencies. USACE noted that the contractor had corrected many of the deficiencies prior to the issuance of our report.³⁰ USACE also noted that it officially notified the contractor to remediate the remaining deficiencies within the contract warranty period and that it withheld almost \$700,000 in retainage and liquidated damages pending satisfactory closeout submittal and approval.³¹
- The Farah provincial reconstruction team responded to concerns about the strength of concrete arches at the Tojg Bridge with a plan to test and confirm the integrity of the concrete. In responding to a draft of our report, USFOR-A officials noted that USACE conducted an assessment, which verified that the bridge's quality control procedures had been adequate and, therefore, provided reasonable assurances that structural concrete placed prior to initiation of testing met design requirements.³²
- USACE took immediate action at the ANA garrison in Gamberi to (1) remedy possible flooding by having drainage areas examined and repaired, and have the contractor conduct frequent surveys for future deteriorating conditions; (2) repair a bridge near the garrison's main entrance that we believed

²⁸ SIGAR Audit 10-09, *ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to be Addressed*, April 30, 2010; and SIGAR Inspection 13-1, *Kunduz ANA Garrison: Army Corps of Engineers Released DynCorp of All Contractual Obligations Despite Poor Performance and Structural Failures*, October 25, 2012.

²⁹ As of February 26, 2016, DOD had provided SIGAR with documentation that allowed us to close three of the five recommendations that remained open on September 30, 2015. Our report on a warehouse facility at Kandahar Airfield still has one open recommendation, and our report on a ANP dry fire range training facility also has one open recommendation (see SIGAR 15-74-IP, *\$14.7 Million Warehouse Facility at Kandahar Airfield: Construction Delays Prevented Facility from Being Used as Intended*, July 15, 2015; and SIGAR 15-27-IP, *Afghan Special Police Training Center's Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Oversight Led to Project Failure*, January 13, 2015).

³⁰ Although we did not issue the final report until July 2012, in April 2012, we briefed USACE on the issues we identified during our site visits and potential solutions.

³¹ SIGAR Inspection 12-01, *Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put \$19 Million Investment at Risk*, July 30, 2012.

³² SIGAR Audit 10-07, *The Tojg Bridge Construction is Nearly Complete, but Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed*, March 1, 2010.

could collapse under heavy traffic because its deck service had been compromised; and (3) designed and planned for the installation of a perimeter fence that we said was needed to secure the weapons training range.³³

- The Kapisa provincial reconstruction team concurred with our recommendation to award a follow-up contract to repair the many deficiencies uncovered during our inspection at the Farukh Shah School, including the need to properly grade and compact the construction site's soil to prevent erosion from undermining the foundation of the school's various structures.³⁴

Although DOD corrected some of the construction deficiencies, making the repairs sometimes resulted in additional expenditures beyond the initial cost of the contracts. For example, at the ANP provincial headquarters in Kunduz, USACE's failure to address potential collapsible soil conditions as part of its \$12.4 million contract award caused a 10-month delay in the project's completion and a \$5 million cost increase.³⁵ In addition, repairs to the Farukh Shah School would require a follow-up contract beyond the \$150,000 in CERP funds already spent. Our reports did not routinely break down additional repair costs since some projects were ongoing at the time of our inspections or additional contracts would occur after our inspections. As a result, we could not determine the total amount spent to make various repairs we identified.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

While some of the DOD projects we inspected from July 2009 through September 2015 were well built and met contract requirements and technical specifications, most of the projects did not meet those requirements and had serious construction deficiencies that, in some cases, had health and safety implications. In many cases, poorly prepared or unqualified contractor personnel, inferior materials, poor workmanship, and inadequate contractor and U.S. government oversight contributed to those substandard results. Despite these problems, many contractors were paid the full contract amount. It is reasonable to expect that before a contractor is paid in full that the facility being built is inspected and all deficiencies corrected, or arrangements made for correcting the deficiencies during the warranty period. Otherwise, U.S. taxpayers are shortchanged, and the Afghans receive unsafe or shoddy facilities.

It is clear from the results of our inspections to date that DOD can and should do better to ensure the requirements of its reconstruction contracts are met to avoid the waste and delay that can come from having to fix or simply abandon deficient projects. This can be done, in part, with better project planning and oversight to ensure that facilities are built correctly. Unless future projects in Afghanistan are better planned and designed, and constructed by qualified contractors that are capable of adhering to requirements, and there is more effective oversight by both the contractor and the U.S. government that includes holding contractors accountable for adhering to their contracts, DOD's reconstruction projects in Afghanistan will continue to be plagued by costly deficiencies.

We recognize DOD's efforts to address our recommendations in a timely manner and in ways that help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of reconstruction projects. Although many of our recommendations were directed toward specific projects, we note that DOD also established procedures that impact the full scope of its reconstruction projects. However, despite these efforts, this report shows that many of the projects we inspected had significant deficiencies caused, in part, by common and recurring problems. This indicates that

³³ SIGAR Audit 10-10, *ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed*, April 30, 2010.

³⁴ SIGAR Inspection 10-01, *Inspection of Farukh Shah School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Project Completion Approved Before All Contract Requirements Met*, October 26, 2009.

³⁵ SIGAR Inspection 13-4, *Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns Remain about the Facility's Usability and Sustainability*, January 24, 2013.

DOD needs to continue working to improve the management and oversight of its reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.

Since our 36 inspection reports contained numerous recommendations to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of DOD's reconstruction activities in Afghanistan, this report does not contain any new recommendations.

AGENCY COMMENTS

We provided a draft of this report to the U.S. Central Command, USFOR-A, CSTC-A, USACE, and the U.S. Air Force Civil Engineer Center. Only USFOR-A and USACE provided written comments, which are reproduced in appendices IV and V, respectively. In addition, USACE provided technical comments, which we incorporated into this report, as appropriate.

In its comments, USFOR-A stated that this report's value "lies in consolidating lessons that may benefit organizations charged with construction efforts in similar environments." USFOR-A noted, however, that our selection of projects was "not a random sampling among the hundreds of construction projects executed, but rather a selection of projects with shared issues." USFOR-A also noted that this report does not represent new research and does not include an associated update on progress made in correcting the discrepancies reported. However, USFOR-A's objections are misplaced. Our objective was to analyze and identify common themes in the findings of the 36 inspection reports that SIGAR issued from July 2009 through September 2015. In addition, at no point in this report do we state that the contracting and construction problems we encountered during the course of our inspections was necessarily representative of all DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan over time. Rather, we believe that the primary value of this report is that it highlights issues on which DOD should focus its quality assurance efforts in current and future construction projects.

In its comments, USACE stated that it appreciated our acknowledgment of the challenges posed by the combined negative impacts of the high-threat security environment and the drawdown of military forces on sustaining continuous construction surveillance and quality control. USACE also stated that it appreciated our remarks that it promptly responded to 90 percent of the deficiencies we identified in the 27 USACE reconstruction projects addressed in this report, and it concurred that the life and safety issues SIGAR discovered during its inspections were troublesome. However, similar to USFOR-A, USACE claimed these 27 projects were not a representative sample of more than 1,200 projects that it had executed during the past 12 years in Afghanistan. As noted above, this objection is misplaced. The stated objective of this audit was to analyze and identify common themes in the findings of the 36 inspection reports that SIGAR issued from July 2009 through September 2015. USACE also stated that it remains firmly committed to continuously improving its approach to construction quality assurance.

APPENDIX I - SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report analyzes and identifies common themes in the findings of the 36 inspection reports that SIGAR issued from July 2009 through September 2015 involving Department of Defense (DOD) reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. Specifically, the objectives of this report were to determine the extent to which (1) contractors met contract requirements and technical specifications when constructing or renovating facilities; (2) the facilities inspected were being used; and (3) DOD has implemented recommendations that we made in those inspection reports.

SIGAR began its inspections of DOD reconstruction projects in May 2009 and issued its first inspection report in July 2009. In preparing this summary report, we reviewed all 36 issued inspection reports involving DOD reconstruction projects in Afghanistan. These 36 reports involved 44 separate DOD reconstruction projects with a combined contract value of about \$1.1 billion.

To determine whether work was completed in accordance with contract requirements and technical specifications, and the facilities were being used, prior to visiting project sites, SIGAR inspectors reviewed project documents including, when available, the construction contract, contract modifications, design drawings, international or other applicable building codes, and quality assurance and other oversight reports. Reviewing these documents helped to identify specific criteria for determining whether construction was performed according to contract requirements, and, if not, whether the responsible administering agency provided adequate project oversight. During the on-site visits, inspectors focused on quality of construction and determined such things as whether the facilities were (1) structurally sound, (2) completed on time and within budget, and (3) being used. In addition to inspecting the facilities, when appropriate, inspectors obtained views about the project from contractors as well as U.S. and Afghan government officials.

For this summary report, we used findings from the 36 inspection reports to highlight successes as well as shortfalls with project planning, management, and oversight of the contracts and construction that led to adherence or nonadherence to contract requirements and technical specifications; use, nonuse, or limited use of facilities; and possible maintenance or sustainment issues with the facilities. To assess whether construction was performed as required, we reviewed the inspection reports to identify efficiency and effectiveness of construction. For example, we reviewed statements in the report and photos to make a determination of whether a project contained construction deficiencies. The same approach applied to identifying whether a facility was or was not being used. It was not our objective to reevaluate the findings in the original inspection reports, but rather to rely on the findings in the reports to evaluate whether projects were completed efficiently and effectively, and to identify common issues and problems that, when avoided, can form the basis for improving the management and effectiveness of reconstruction projects in Afghanistan.

To identify and assess whether DOD had implemented recommendations that we made in our inspection reports, we first identified all recommendations made to DOD in the 36 inspection reports issued from July 2009 through September 2015. To determine whether the recommendations were closed or open, we reviewed our January 2015 report on SIGAR recommendations to DOD to determine the status of each inspection recommendation and followed up with the relevant DOD entities and commands to determine the status of any recommendations made since the issuance of the January 2015 report.³⁶ The information gathered from these two sources allowed us to determine the status of each of the 95 recommendations made to DOD in our 36 inspection reports issued from July 2009 through September 2015.

We conducted our work on this report from July 2015 through March 2016, in Arlington, Virginia, in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. SIGAR performed this work under the authority of Public Law No. 110-181, as amended; and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. Of the 36 inspections included in this report, 27 were completed in accordance with *Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation*, published by the

³⁶ SIGAR 15-29-AR includes a description of SIGAR's recommendation follow-up process.

Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency. The 9 other inspections were conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. The engineering assessments were conducted by our professional engineers in accordance with the National Society of Professional Engineers' *Code of Ethics for Engineers*.

APPENDIX II - SIGAR INSPECTION REPORTS INVOLVING DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN (JULY 2009 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2015)

Table 1 - SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015

Report Number, Title, Date Issued, Original Contract Amount, and Administering Agency	Findings	Recommendations, Responsible Entity, and Recommendation Status as of December 31, 2015
<p>SIGAR Inspection 09-01, <i>Improvements to the Khowst City Electrical Power System: Safety and Sustainability Issues Were Not Adequately Addressed</i>, July 28, 2009</p> <p>\$1.57 Million</p> <p>Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility not built as required, but it is being used.</p> <p>(2) Contract 1 omitted several important project requirements; however, contract 2 effectively addressed project requirements.</p> <p>(3) Contractor 1 did not meet several requirements.</p> <p>(4) U.S. provincial reconstruction team's quality assurance was inadequate.</p> <p>(5) Afghan government may have difficulty operating and maintaining the city electrical power system.</p>	<p>(1) Correct the safety hazards and other technical deficiencies noted in this report. (Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Assign qualified personnel to provide oversight of the follow-on Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) projects to correct safety hazards and technical deficiencies at the Khowst Power System. (Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Provide training and mentoring of the power plant management and personnel to build capacity for addressing long-term maintenance and sustainability. (Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Review other CERP projects to determine whether adequate project oversight, training and mentoring is being provided to build capacity for long-term project sustainability. (Khowst Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 09-02, <i>Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met, But Sustainability Concerns Exist</i>, October 2, 2009</p> <p>\$6.60 Million</p> <p>Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and it is being used.</p> <p>(2) Kapisa Province Ministry of Public Works lacks the capacity—equipment, material, or personnel—to maintain the road, once completed.</p> <p>(3) SIGAR estimates the lifetime of the road to be 5 years, unless an effective repair and maintenance program is implemented.</p>	<p>(1) Continue coordination with the U.S. Agency for International Development to include this road in the expanding Management and Operation Program and develop capacity for repairing and maintaining roads at the provincial level. (U.S. Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A); Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Provide information through the Combined Information Data Network Exchange system to give the U.S. Agency for International Development visibility of this project's details. (Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 10-01, <i>Farukh Shah School Construction Project, Kapisa Province: Project Completion Approved Before All Contract Requirements Met</i>, October 26, 2009</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Project was closed out with significant work remaining to be completed, specifically school building, latrine, guard house, power plant, hand pump, and site cleanup.</p>	<p>(1) Issue a follow-up contract to address the construction deficiencies noted in this report. (Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Place greater emphasis on developing detailed scopes of work that anticipate and address critical design issues that are particular to each construction project rather than relying solely on</p>

<p>\$0.15 Million</p> <p>Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(3) We identified significant design deficiencies, including improper grading and the absence of a retaining wall that we believe should have been included in the project's scope of work.</p> <p>(4) Project was delayed by 2 years, and provincial reconstruction team says the provincial director of education pressured it to turning over the school "as-is" because students and teachers were using an outdoor area for instruction.</p>	<p>standard design plans. (Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 10-02, Abdul Manan Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Insufficient Planning, Safety Problems, and Poor Quality Control Affect Project Results, October 26, 2009</p> <p>\$0.25 Million</p> <p>Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required and was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Statement of Work did not include major construction elements, resulting in a contract modification and cost increase, and subsequent award that was determined to be in violation of CERP guidelines requiring contract termination and project re-bid.</p> <p>(3) Lack of standardized quality assurance guidelines for CERP-funded projects.</p>	<p>(1) Take action to correct the multiple deficiencies noted in this report. This should start with ensuring both the Statement of Work and the Design Plan for this project reflect specific construction requirements, such as site location and contractor capabilities. (USFOR-A and Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Develop standardized quality assurance guidelines that can be used to manage this and other CERP-funded projects. (USFOR-A and Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 10-03, Habib Rahman Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Design and Safety Issues Require Attention, October 26, 2009</p> <p>\$0.31 Million</p> <p>Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and was not being used.</p> <p>(2) We identified contract and design issues. Specifically, the contract did not require removal of the existing unfinished structure, lack of a reinforced retaining wall, and lack of necessary earth removal work.</p> <p>(3) Inadequate provincial reconstruction team management and quality assurance program that later improved.</p>	<p>(1) Initiate a follow-on CERP project to correct the design and safety deficiencies noted in this report. (USFOR-A and Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 10-04, Kohi Girls' School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Construction Delays Resolved, But Safety Concerns Remain, October 26, 2009</p> <p>\$0.22 Million</p> <p>Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but was not being used.</p>	<p>(1) Develop a plan for the removal of war-related debris from areas adjacent to the Kohi Girls' School construction project. (Kapisa Provincial Reconstruction Team; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>

<p>SIGAR Audit 10-07, <i>The Tojg Bridge Construction is Nearly Complete, but Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed</i>, March 1, 2010</p> <p>\$1.75 Million</p> <p>Farah Provincial Reconstruction Team</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Concrete testing and other quality control measures were inadequate to ensure structural integrity of bridge.</p> <p>(3) Land ownership rights to bridge approaches were not documented.</p> <p>(4) Sustainability a concern in that local Afghan public works department lacks funding, equipment, and personnel.</p>	<p>(1) Establish accountability for the gravel plant and associated equipment to ensure the plant's sustainability. (USFOR-A and International Security Assistance Force; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Ensure that necessary quality control and quality assurance procedures are performed and adequately documented, including (a) testing of critical construction materials is completed, (b) the structural concrete meets design requirements, and (c) preparation of weekly engineer reports documenting quality control and corrective actions. (USFOR-A and International Security Assistance Force; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Ensure land rights associated with the bridge approaches are documented and transferred to the Afghan government. (USFOR-A and International Security Assistance Force; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Address deficiencies in the contract files per applicable guidance. (USFOR-A and International Security Assistance Force; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 10-09, <i>ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed</i>, April 30, 2010</p> <p>\$72.80 Million</p> <p>U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Severe settling of soil was damaging buildings.</p> <p>(3) Poor welds and rust could lead to roof failure.</p> <p>(4) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command–Afghanistan (CSTC-A) officials were unaware of any justifications or planning documents for the garrison that addressed the strategic deployment of troops, garrisons, locations, or operations; however, the planning reports reviewed did not address these matters.</p> <p>(5) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan/CSTC-A officials stated that the Afghan government does not have financial or technical capacity to sustain the Kunduz garrison or other Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) facilities.</p>	<p>(1) Repair the welds and mitigate the rust on steel supports on the affected structures. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Resolve the soil stability issue and determine what mitigation or corrective actions are required for DynCorp to complete the garrison, including ensuring that the site is properly graded. (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Ensure the Kunduz garrison's contract files are maintained according to USACE guidance. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 10-10, <i>ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed</i>, April 30, 2010</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Facility appears well built, but poor flood control measures and site grading could lead to problems.</p>	<p>(1) Mitigate silt accumulation in the anti-vehicle and flood control trench. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Ensure that the site is properly graded. (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>

<p>\$129.80 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(3) Concrete deck of the short bridge near the garrison's entrance is eroding.</p> <p>(4) North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission–Afghanistan/CSTC-A officials stated they were unaware of any justification or planning documents for garrison's use.</p> <p>(5) Afghan government does not have capacity to sustain the Gamberi garrison or ANSF facilities.</p>	<p>(3) Repair bridge near the main entrance to the garrison. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Secure the weapons training range with a perimeter fence. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 10-12, <i>ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues</i>, July 22, 2010</p> <p>\$45.00 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Four projects completed, but delays ranged from 6 months to 2 years.</p> <p>(3) No construction issues revealed.</p> <p>(4) Inadequate project planning and oversight affected all four projects.</p> <p>(5) Afghan government does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain ANSF facilities once they are completed.</p>	<p>(1) Ensure that future projects adhere to USACE's established quality assurance and quality control procedures. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Review and update current guidance on austere construction standards to include more detailed guidance regarding heating and cooling options for various types of facilities, with the option to allow for regional differences. (Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), in consultation with USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Provide guidance regarding appropriate electrical, plumbing, and other fixtures for facilities. (CSTC-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 10-14, <i>ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Should Be Addressed</i>, July 30, 2010</p> <p>\$68.10 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Phase I completed 16 months past original completion date, and Phase II is 12 months behind schedule.</p> <p>(3) Contract management and oversight met requirements.</p> <p>(4) Afghan government does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain all ANSF facilities; therefore, two contracts were being awarded to provide operations and maintenance for ANSF facilities.</p>	<p>(1) Ensure that the site is properly graded around buildings to prevent the pooling of water. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Ensure that the asphalt roads and parking lots are properly compacted to minimize deterioration. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Consider mitigating silt accumulation in the unlined drainage ditches around the garrison to minimize maintenance. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 11-03, <i>ANP District Headquarters Facilities in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces Have Significant Deficiencies Due to Lack of Oversight and Poor Contractor Performance</i>, October 27, 2010</p> <p>Nad Ali ANP District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million</p>	<p>Our final inspection covered six sites. These findings applied to all sites.</p> <p>(1) Construction was poor, and two suspension letters were issued.</p> <p>(2) Project was for six Afghan National Police (ANP) facilities: one site turned over to the ANP, another site cleared for turnover, nominal progress on another site, and three sites remain idle.</p> <p>(3) Almost all performance payments have been paid out, and minimal funds</p>	<p>Our final inspection covered six sites. These recommendations applied to all sites.</p> <p>(1) Perform complete engineering evaluations at each of the six ANP project sites to determine the required level of reconstruction and repair needed to comply with the contract requirements. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Pursue all available options to obtain necessary repairs by Basirat or recoup costs if the repairs are not made. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Require that the maximum amount of retainage allowable by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (10</p>

Nahri Saraj ANP District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million	were withheld from contractor payments to cover deficient work.	percent) be withheld from each payment for projects where information on the construction progress and quality is obtained primarily through the contractor or Local National Quality Assurance reports and where the contracting officer determines that satisfactory progress has not been made. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)
Spin Boldak District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million	Individual site findings were as follows: (1) Nad Ali ANP District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.	
Takha Pul District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million	(2) Nahri Saraj ANP District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.	(4) Institute a requirement for USACE personnel to conduct site visits and verify payments for construction progress if the completed work has only been verified by photographs taken by the contractor or where the information provided by the reports does not meet USACE quality assurance reporting standards. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)
Zeheli ANP District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million	(3) Spin Boldak District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.	(5) Ensure compliance with USACE quality assurance standards on this and related projects, by directing Afghanistan Engineering District-South to require quality assurance representatives to file daily reports, ensure three-phase testing is implemented, and perform and record quality control testing. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)
Garm Ser ANP District Headquarters: \$0.84 Million	(4) Takha Pul District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.	(6) Direct Afghanistan Engineering District-South to develop a process and procedure for coordinating with local coalition force units to (a) help confirm construction progress claims, and (b) determine the feasibility of using coalition force assets to supplement security and transportation needs. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)
Total: \$5.88 Million ^a	(5) Zeheli ANP District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.	
USACE	(6) Garm Ser ANP District Headquarters: Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.	
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SIGAR Audit 11-09, <i>ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, but Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened</i> , April 25, 2011	Our inspection covered two sites—Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat—and each site had its own contractor—CH2M Hill and AMEC Earth and Environmental, Incorporated, respectively. These findings applied to both sites.	Our inspection covered two sites. These recommendations applied to both sites.
Camp Shaheen: \$17.00 Million	(1) The contractors experienced construction delays and cost increases—75 percent schedule growth and an estimated cost overrun of \$1.68 million—because AFCEE did not exercise adequate contractor oversight.	(1) Establish and implement procedures, including specific deadlines, to ensure that contracting officers follow up on contractors' corrective action plans in a timely manner. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)
Afghan National Army (ANA) facilities at Camp Zafar: \$11.60 Million	(2) The quality of construction at both sites generally met the contract requirements.	(2) Take immediate action to finalize the performance rating of AMEC Earth and Environmental, Incorporated, the prime contractor at Camp Zafar, and add this rating to the Construction Contractor Appraisal Support System. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)
Total: \$28.60 Million		
Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment (AFCEE)	Individual site findings were as follows: (1) Camp Shaheen: Facility was built as required and was being used. (2) ANA facilities at Camp Zafar: Facility was built as required and was being used.	

<p>SIGAR Inspection 12-1, <i>Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put \$19 Million Investment at Risk</i>, July 30, 2012</p> <p>Lal Por 1: \$4.55 Million</p> <p>Lal Por 2: \$4.48 Million</p> <p>Nazyan Base: \$4.77 Million</p> <p>Total: \$13.80 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>Our inspection covered three sites. This finding applied to all sites.</p> <p>(1) USACE failed to follow its quality control and assurance processes, and, primarily due to security concerns, did not verify that construction at the bases had been completed prior to acceptance and transfer to CSTC-A.</p> <p>Individual site findings were as follows:</p> <p>Lal Por 1:</p> <p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) We observed various construction deficiencies.</p> <p>Lal Por 2:</p> <p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) The base had no viable water supply.</p> <p>(3) We observed various construction deficiencies.</p> <p>Nazyan Base:</p> <p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The base may soon be uninhabitable if the septic system continues to back up into the pipes causing overflow.</p> <p>(3) We observed structural failures as a result of an inadequate drainage system.</p> <p>(4) Most facilities were either unoccupied or not used for their intended purpose.</p>	<p>Our inspection covered three sites. These recommendations applied to all sites.</p> <p>(1) Review the current status of construction deficiencies identified as part of the transfer of the bases, including the critical water supply and septic and sewage system deficiencies, and determine a resolution that is in the best interest of the U.S. government and without unnecessary additional government cost. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Determine the method of repair for the deficiencies still outstanding, including (a) remediation by the contractor, as part of complying with the contract terms; (b) recovery under warranty, as stipulated in the contract remediation timeframes and warranty terms; and (c) determining whether retainage and liquidated damages should be released to the contractor as part of contract closeout. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Based on the determination in recommendation 1, prepare a plan of action for the repairs and ensure the repairs are completed, inspected, and approved as expediently as possible. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) For ongoing and future construction contracts, adhere to Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements and USACE Engineering Regulation 1180-1-6 for effectively managing a Quality Management Program, by ensuring that (a) each USACE Resident/Area Office is aware of and has access to the applicable Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan; (b) the contractor has developed an effective Contractor Quality Control Program, which is adequately monitored and assessed through the Quality Assurance Program; (c) construction deficiencies are tracked and remedied in a timely manner, to ensure quality construction is delivered at project completion, as part of the transfer process; and (d) per the terms of the transfer process, the Road & Roof Construction Company provides the requisite operations and maintenance manuals as well as the appropriate technical documents and training required for safe and effective operation of the facilities. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 12-02, <i>Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center</i>, October 26, 2011</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The project (Phase III) was not completed. The project experienced both cost growth and schedule delays.</p>	<p>(1) Direct that site surveys done in conjunction with the Kabul Military Training Center conceptual master plan be more detailed, including topography and location of existing utilities, so that a more complete picture of additional construction projects can be provided to bidders, thus allowing contract proposals to more accurately reflect reality. We</p>

<p>\$140.00 Million</p> <p>AFCEE</p>	<p>(3) Some completed facilities were not being used as intended. Due to the expanded number of recruits, a gymnasium was being used for housing.</p> <p>(4) The Afghan government does not have the financial or technical capacity to sustain the center once completed.</p>	<p>support CSTC-A's efforts to develop the organic capability to do this and in the interim recommend that CSTC-A, in concert with AFCEE, use existing planning contracts to provide the integration function. (CSTC-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Ensure that conceptual master plans for future construction projects in support of the ANSF contain more detailed information, including topography and the location of existing utilities, to facilitate the preparation of more accurate contract proposals. (CSTC-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Ensure that, in the future, Kabul Military Training Center contract and task order files contain complete and consistent information regarding reasons for modifications to the contract and task orders. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Seek reimbursement from the Phase I and II contractor, AMEC Earth and Environmental, Incorporated, for the cost of electrical repairs related to poor performance by its Afghan subcontractors. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Audit 12-03, <i>Afghan National Security University Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract Administration Needs Improvement</i>, October 26, 2011</p> <p>\$170.00 Million</p> <p>AFCEE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Construction (Phase I) was not completed, and the project has experienced cost growth and schedule delays. However, the quality of construction at the university generally met contract requirements.</p>	<p>(1) Assure that, in the future, the Afghan National Security University task order file is complete, including complete and consistent documentation as to the reasons for task order modifications and that all notices to proceed are included in the contract files, and consider expanding the practice to all CSTC-A funded task order files. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Assure that out-of-scope modifications are properly justified, approved, and documented. (AFCEE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-1, <i>Kunduz ANA Garrison: Army Corps of Engineers Released Dyncorp of All Contractual Obligations Despite Poor Performance and Structural Failures</i>, October 25, 2012</p> <p>\$55.50 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Subsequent SIGAR review determined ongoing problem of failed structures, potential structural failure, and severe soil settling and grading issues.</p> <p>(3) Inadequate construction quality and noncompliance with contract specifications.</p> <p>(4) USACE released the contractor from any further contractual obligations without requiring the contractor to provide remediation of structural failures that will require additional funding above the \$72.8 million paid to the contractor.</p>	<p>(1) Justify the cost of further repairs and remediation of structural failures at Camp Pamir funded with Afghan Security Forces Fund appropriations to ensure that further construction is warranted, at reasonable cost to the U.S. government. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Submit the DynCorp settlement to an appropriate audit agency for review, in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation 49.107(a). Based on the review, the audit agency should submit written comments and recommendations. While the audit results would normally be communicated to the termination contracting officer, due to the questionable nature of the settlement, we further recommend that the audit results and recommendations be reviewed by the Commanding General. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>

		(3) Explain in writing why the settlement was determined to be fair and reasonable. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-2, <i>Wardak Province National Police Training Center: Contract Requirements Generally Met, but Deficiencies and Maintenance Issues Need to Be Addressed</i>, October 30, 2012</p> <p>\$96.10 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and was being used.</p> <p>(2) Buildings and facilities were generally used as intended and constructed in accordance with contract specifications.</p>	<p>(1) Replace diesel fuel tank grounding connections with those specified in the design documents to avoid a potentially dangerous condition. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Repair roof leaks around the vehicle exhaust ventilation pipes in the vehicle maintenance building. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Repair the missing storm water outlet grating in the perimeter wall, which could enable a person to gain unauthorized access to the compound. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Regularly clean silt and construction debris from the storm drain system. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-3, <i>Gamberi Afghan National Army Garrison: Site Grading and Infrastructure Maintenance Problems Put Facilities at Risk</i>, October 30, 2012</p> <p>\$126.50 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Sustaining the Gamberi ANA garrison continues to be at risk due to the lack of remediation for ongoing flood control issues and inadequate grading.</p>	<p>(1) Repair damaged storm water facilities by repairing eroding ditches and removing sediment and debris on roads, in ditches, and in perimeter wall outlets throughout the garrison. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Implement mitigating flood control measures, such as adding gravel to low lying roads where flooding regularly occurs to drain these areas more quickly. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Establish and follow a program to maintain the storm water drainage system and ensure that timely repairs are made to correct the deficiencies that we identified. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Conduct a structural analysis and design review of the culvert design package and take appropriate actions to correct any deficiencies identified. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-4, <i>Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns Remain About the Facility's Usability and Sustainability</i>, January 24, 2013</p> <p>\$12.40 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Construction was only 50 percent complete, but what was completed appeared adequate. No personnel were occupying the facility.</p> <p>(3) The facility's only source of electrical power is a single diesel generator with no backup or alternate connection to the local electrical grid or other backup electrical power supply.</p> <p>(4) The contractor was having problems with collapsible soil and sink holes on the project site.</p>	<p>(1) Provide electrical back-up at the lift station, such as an auxiliary electrical generator, to provide back-up power to continue pumping untreated sewage into the sewage treatment plant and help mitigate the potential for sewage overflow when the main generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Review the decision made at the start of the project to not connect the site to the local electrical grid and, as part of the review, conduct a cost-benefit and technical analysis. The review should factor in the high costs to purchase and deliver fuel to the site for the electrical generator, the capability of the local grid to provide adequate power for the site facilities and equipment, and the need for a</p>

		<p>back-up electrical system. Based on the results, if connection to the local power grid is not feasible, install a back-up site generator or otherwise provide an appropriate back-up electrical power system to prevent loss of electricity across the site when the primary generator is not working. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Award an operations and maintenance contract at project completion to ensure that the facility is appropriately maintained once occupied. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-5, <i>Iman Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: \$7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused</i>, January 29, 2013</p> <p>\$5.70 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The facility sat largely unused. Only approximately 12 personnel were on site during the SIGAR site inspection, and on-site personnel were not aware of plans to move additional staff into the compound.</p> <p>(3) The facility lacks an emergency supply, e.g., a backup generator.</p> <p>(4) There is no operation and maintenance contract for on-site facilities and equipment, nor are there plans to provide training to local Afghan personnel.</p> <p>(5) The wood-burning stoves were dismantled, and justifications provided conflicted with one another.</p>	<p>(1) Review plans for constructing Afghan Border Police facilities to determine whether site construction contracts can be downsized or facilities redesigned to reduce unnecessary costs or if facilities, including this location, are even needed; and provide an explanation of the review results. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Rather than relying solely on a single generator, determine the feasibility of installing a backup generator or connecting the site electrical system to the local power grid to prevent loss of electricity across the site when the primary generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages, including lack of fuel. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Award an operations and maintenance contract or otherwise provide training to Afghan personnel to ensure that the facility is appropriately maintained after the withdrawal of coalition forces. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Determine why the Afghan Border Police dismantled the wood-burning stoves at Imam Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters and assess the need to provide wood-burning stoves at other facilities currently under construction or planned for construction in the future. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-6, <i>Afghan National Police Main Road Security Company, Kunduz Province, Is Behind Schedule, And May Not Be Sustainable</i>, April 17, 2013</p> <p>\$1.70 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) One generator provides all of the compound's electricity, and the contract scope of work has no provision for a backup generator or connection to the municipal power grid.</p> <p>(3) The Afghan power grid was inadequate for the facility's current demand and significant investment was required to connect to the national grid.</p> <p>(4) The project was behind schedule. At the time of our site visit, 54 percent of the</p>	<p>(1) Review the ANP Main Road Security Company site design and install a back-up power system, at least for mission critical systems, to prevent loss of site electricity when the primary generator is out of service for repair or maintenance or from unintended power outages, including the lack of fuel. (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Determine an appropriate means for ensuring operation and maintenance of the compound at project completion, and that the site is appropriately maintained as part of the turnover to the Afghan government. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>

	performance period had passed but only 15 percent of the work had been completed.	
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-7, <i>Qala-i-Muslim Medical Clinic: Serving The Community Well, But Construction Quality Could Not Be Fully Assessed</i>, April 17, 2013</p> <p>\$0.16 Million</p> <p>Joint Task Force-Kabul</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The facility was being used for its intended purposes, and enhanced the medical capabilities of the village.</p> <p>(3) Ministry of Public Health was fulfilling its commitment to sustain the medical clinic.</p> <p>(4) No major construction issues were observed.</p>	<p>(1) Ensure that project documentation related to CERP projects complies with CERP guidance. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Periodically review the Combined Information Data Network Exchange database to ensure that all required project documents are uploaded into the database. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-8, <i>Forward Operating Base Salerno: Inadequate Planning Resulted in \$5 Million Spent for Unused Incinerators and the Continued Use of Potentially Hazardous Open-Air Burn Pit Operations</i>, April 25, 2013</p> <p>\$5.40 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Inadequate planning resulted in incinerators and supporting facilities that will never be used, or, if used, do not have adequate capacity to provide for the complete disposal of the facility's solid waste.</p> <p>(3) The incinerators were not being maintained due to excessive operation and maintenance costs, and had fallen into disrepair.</p>	<p>(1) Take appropriate measures to prevent a reoccurrence of stagnant water at the Forward Operating Base Salerno incinerator facility. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Expedite the contract for solid waste removal to facilitate the earlier cessation of open-air burn pit operations. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Develop a list of disposition options for the Forward Operating Base Salerno incinerators, determine the most cost effective option for the U.S. government, and provide SIGAR the results within 60 days. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR Inspection 13-10, <i>Bathkhak School: Unauthorized Contract Design Changes and Poor Construction Could Compromise Structural Integrity</i>, July 24, 2013</p> <p>\$0.26 Million</p> <p>Regional Contracting Command-Central</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Afghan ministry officials modified the construction contract without consulting with or obtaining the approval of the U.S. contracting officer.</p> <p>(3) Poor planning and construction resulted in a structurally deficient school building being constructed in an earthquake-prone area.</p>	<p>(1) Prior to turning over the facilities to the Afghans, perform an immediate physical inspection of the two new school buildings, including appropriate engineering tests and analyses, and determine whether to certify the structural integrity of the buildings. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Require the contractor to correct any deficiencies or substandard work identified during the physical inspection and tests. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Review the product substitutions made, and, based on a price analysis, determine whether the changes warrant a reduction in the overall cost of the contract. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Identify the contracting officer(s) responsible for initial oversight of the Bathkhak school construction activities and determine why (a) no oversight visits were made during the first 6 months of construction; (b) no contract modifications were made approving the contractor's substitution of building materials; and (c) no pricing determinations were made of the building materials substituted for those required in the contract. After making these determinations,</p>

		decide what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against the contracting officer(s) responsible for not properly overseeing construction activities. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)
<p>SIGAR 14-5-IP, <i>Archi District Police Headquarters: Extensive Mold, Lack of Running Water, and Inoperable Electrical Systems Show Facilities Are Not Being Sustained</i>, October 20, 2013</p> <p>\$0.29 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The facilities were not being maintained and were in a state of disrepair, with an estimated 40 ANP personnel living and working in facilities with extensive mold growing on the interior walls and ceilings of the barracks and bathrooms.</p> <p>(3) The bathrooms were virtually unusable because of missing sink faucets and showers in disrepair.</p> <p>(4) The facility's water well no longer worked, requiring water to be trucked to the site daily.</p> <p>(5) The facility only had 3 hours of electricity per day, which was provided by a small back-up generator.</p>	<p>(1) Determine why U.S. funds provided to the Ministry of Interior for the operation and maintenance of ANP facilities since December 2012 have not been used to maintain the Archi District Police Headquarters and what corrective actions will be taken to ensure direct funds to the Ministry of Interior for operation and maintenance are used as intended, and report back to SIGAR within 90 days. (North Atlantic Treaty Organization Training Mission-Afghanistan/CSTC-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR 14-10-IP, <i>Walayatti Medical Clinic: Facility Was Not Constructed According to Design Specifications and Has Never Been Used</i>, October 30, 2013</p> <p>\$0.19 Million</p> <p>Joint Task Force-Kabul</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) The clinic was completed; however, it was empty and had never been used.</p> <p>(3) The Ministry of Public Health was not maintaining the clinic, even though Joint Task Force-Kabul and the Ministry of Public Health signed an agreement for the ministry to staff and equip the clinic upon its official transfer to the Afghan government. Ministry officials said they were not aware of their responsibility to do so. U.S. government had failed to coordinate with the Ministry's Policy and Planning directorate and had not officially transferred the facility to the Afghan government.</p>	<p>(1) Take steps to assist the Afghan government in installing the equipment required under the CERP contract or suitable alternative equipment. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Determine whether Walayatti medical clinic has been officially transferred to the Ministry of Public Health and, if not, take immediate action to do so. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Work with Ministry of Public Health to take appropriate action to equip, staff, and sustain the medical clinic for the Walayatti village inhabitants. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR 14-13-IP, <i>Forward Operating Base Sharana: Poor Planning and Construction Resulted in \$5.4 Million Spent for Inoperable Incinerators and Continued Use of Open-Air Burn Pits</i>, December 16, 2013</p> <p>\$5.60 Million</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Incinerators were not used 3 years after completion.</p> <p>(3) Contractor paid in full despite major construction deficiencies and delays, and without testing to see whether incinerators were operational.</p> <p>(4) Even if operational, the two incinerators were built too close together</p>	<p>(1) Conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of the acceptance of the incinerator facility at Forward Operating Base Sharana and the payment of \$5.4 million to the contractor. (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Based on the results of this inquiry, determine if any action should be taken against the contracting officer(s). (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p>

USACE	<p>and would have required extensive manual labor to load incinerators and remove ash.</p> <p>(5) As a result, base continued to use open-air burn pit in violation of regulations.</p>	
<p>SIGAR 14-31-IP, <i>Salang Hospital: Lack of Water and Power Severely Limits Hospital Services, and Major Construction Deficiencies Raise Safety Concerns</i>, January 29, 2014</p> <p>\$0.60 Million</p> <p>Regional Contracting Center-Bagram</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The hospital had no electricity or water.</p> <p>(3) Building was three times larger than designed.</p> <p>(4) Unenforced expansion joint in building makes hospital highly susceptible to earthquake damage.</p> <p>(5) Hospital treats about 70 patients daily, but does not provide many intended services like surgery and dental care.</p>	<p>(1) Identify the contracting officer(s) responsible for oversight of the Salang hospital construction activities and determine: (a) why the hospital was not built according to contract specifications and acceptable construction standards; and (b) what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against the contracting officer(s) who failed to provide required oversight. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Identify the CERP program manager(s) and project purchasing officer responsible for Salang hospital and determine why required documents were not placed in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange database. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Perform a physical inspection of the building, including appropriate engineering tests and analyses, and, given its location in a high seismic activity zone, determine what corrections are required to ensure the structural integrity of the building. (USFOR-A; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR 14-41-IP, <i>Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Requirements, but It Is Unclear if Facility is Being Used as Intended</i>, March 12, 2014</p> <p>\$3.93 Million</p> <p>Regional Contracting Center-Kabul</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Barracks, administration building, and other structures appeared well-built.</p> <p>(3) Dining facility was not completed and contractor had abandoned project.</p> <p>(4) Camp Monitor was empty and unused at time of 2013 inspection.</p> <p>(5) Nine months later, USFOR-A informed SIGAR that the remote camp was now in use by the ANA, and the dining facility was being completed.</p>	None
<p>SIGAR 14-81-IP, <i>Shindand Airbase: Use of Open-Air Burn Pit Violated Department of Defense Regulations</i>, July 14, 2014</p> <p>\$5.91 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, and it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Two incinerators built for U.S. use were being used after warranty repairs made.</p> <p>(3) Two incinerators installed for use by Afghan military were not being used.</p> <p>(4) Disposal of prohibited waste continued at a burn pit after incinerators were operational.</p>	<p>(1) Determine why the U.S. military continued to send its solid waste to the open-air burn pits at Shindand Airbase for 5 months after incinerators became fully operational. (U.S. Central Command; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Determine why prohibited "covered" waste was burned in open-air burn pits at Shindand Airbase as early as January 2011 and why the Department of Defense (DOD) did not notify Congress, as required under Section 317 of the 2010 National Defense</p>

		Authorization Act. (U.S. Central Command; Closed-Implemented)
<p>SIGAR 14-82-IP, <i>Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility: Quality of Construction Appears To Be Good, but The Facility Has Not Been Used to Date</i>, July 16, 2014</p> <p>\$2.89 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Project completion delayed by about 8 months due to threatened and actual Taliban violence.</p>	<p>(1) DOD's Task Force for Business and Stability Operations should ensure that before approving future investment projects of any kind, there are willing investor(s) capable of assuming ownership of and responsibility for maintaining constructed facilities, or, in the absence of investors, that the Afghan Ministry of Commerce and Industry is willing and able to assume those responsibilities itself. (Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR 15-25-IP, <i>ANA Camp Commando Phase II: Power Plant and Fuel Point Not Fully Operational Nearly Two Years After Project Completion</i>, January 6, 2015</p> <p>\$15.10 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) Power from new \$7 million electrical plant limited to one quarter of intended maximum output because of an unauthorized connection by the ANA damaged the plant.</p> <p>(3) Fuel station appeared well-built but fuel pumps were never used. (A second fuel station costing \$1 million was built nearby and also was not being used.)</p>	<p>(1) Determine the amount paid to the Phase II contractor for required work that was not completed on the camp's power plant and fuel point, and, where appropriate, recoup those funds. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(2) Provide documentation showing that the power plant's electrical system has been fully tested and commissioned. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p> <p>(3) Determine the reason(s) why the ANA has not used the Phase II fuel point to dispense fuel for vehicles, and, based on the results, decide whether steps should be taken to make it operational. (USACE; Closed-Not Implemented)</p> <p>(4) Determine the circumstances leading to the acceptance of the Phase II work as completed, with full payment made to the contractor, when known deficiencies existed. Based on the results, determine what disciplinary action, if any, should be taken against the contracting officer or contracting officer's representative. (USACE; Closed-Implemented)</p>
<p>SIGAR 15-27-IP, <i>Afghan Special Police Training Center's Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Performance and Poor Government Oversight Led to Project Failure</i>, January 13, 2015</p> <p>\$0.46 Million</p> <p>Regional Contracting Center-Forward Operating Base Shank</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, but it was being used.</p> <p>(2) The facility was used, but buildings began to disintegrate 4 months after construction because of substandard building materials and construction.</p> <p>(3) Facility was demolished and was being rebuilt with Afghan government funds.</p>	<p>(1) Determine the extent to which Qesmatullah Nasrat Construction Company substituted building materials without authorization or did not complete work according to the contract requirements and, where appropriate, recoup those funds. (U.S. Central Command; Open)</p> <p>(2) Identify the contracting officer and contracting officer's representatives responsible for oversight of the construction activities and determine:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> why the range was not built according to contract requirements and acceptable construction standards; and what disciplinary action should be taken against these contracting officials for failing to provide adequate oversight. (U.S. Central Command; Open)

<p>SIGAR 15-51-IP, <i>Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse: Stalled Construction Project Was Terminated After \$1.25 Million Spent</i>, April 20, 2015</p> <p>\$12.00 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was not built as required, and it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Project was terminated for convenience 9 months after construction began.</p> <p>(3) A partially built security perimeter wall around a largely open field resulted.</p> <p>(4) Termination came as a result of a separate DOD program reducing facility inventory.</p>	<p>None</p>
<p>SIGAR 15-74-IP, <i>\$14.70 Million Warehouse Facility at Kandahar Airfield: Construction Delays Prevented Facility From Being Used as Intended</i>, July 15, 2015</p> <p>\$13.50 Million</p> <p>USACE</p>	<p>(1) Facility was built as required, but it was not being used.</p> <p>(2) Defense Logistics Agency warehouse facility was well constructed, with a few minor deficiencies.</p> <p>(3) The project experienced delays due to poor performance of the first contractor.</p> <p>(4) The construction contract price was higher than originally planned and continued to increase even after the U.S. Army, USFOR-A, and Defense Logistics Agency knew the facility was no longer needed.</p> <p>(5) Defense Logistics Agency never used the facility. The facility remained empty after it took custody, with a few minor exceptions.</p>	<p>(1) Determine and identify, and report back to SIGAR within 90 days, who made the decision, and why, to allow contract modifications to be made and additional funds to be spent on the warehouses after the decision was made in August 2013 to end the Defense Logistics Agency's mission in Kandahar. (U.S. Central Command; Open)</p>

Source: SIGAR analysis of inspection reports through September 2015

Note: ^aThe total contract amount of \$5.9 million included one facility, Bughran ANP District Headquarters (\$0.84 million), that was later de-scoped from the contract and, as a result, was not included in our inspection.

APPENDIX III - BUILDING AND USAGE INFORMATION FOR SIGAR INSPECTION REPORTS ON DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN AFGHANISTAN FOR JULY 2009 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 2015

Table 2 lists SIGAR's inspection reports, issued from July 2009 through September 2015, on Department of Defense reconstruction projects in Afghanistan, along with information about whether the facilities were built as required and were being used.

Table 2 - SIGAR Inspection Reports, Along with Building and Usage Information

Report Number, Title, and Date Issued	Built as Required	Facilities Used
SIGAR Inspection 09-01, <i>Improvements to the Khowst City Electrical Power System: Safety and Sustainability Issues Were Not Adequately Addressed</i> , July 28, 2009	No	Yes
SIGAR Inspection 09-02, <i>Mahmood Raqi to Nijrab Road Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Contract Requirements Met, But Sustainability Concerns Exist</i> , October 2, 2009	Yes	Yes
SIGAR Inspection 10-01, <i>Farukh Shah School Construction Project, Kapisa Province: Project Completion Approved Before All Contract Requirements Met</i> , October 26, 2009	No	Yes
SIGAR Inspection 10-02, <i>Abdul Manan Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Insufficient Planning, Safety Problems, and Poor Quality Control Affect Project Results</i> , October 26, 2009	No	No
SIGAR Inspection 10-03, <i>Habib Rahman Secondary School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Design and Safety Issues Require Attention</i> , October 26, 2009	No	No*
SIGAR Inspection 10-04, <i>Kohi Girls' School Construction Project in Kapisa Province: Construction Delays Resolved, But Safety Concerns Remain</i> , October 26, 2009	Yes	No*
SIGAR Audit 10-07, <i>The Tojg Bridge Construction is Nearly Complete, but Several Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed</i> , March 1, 2010	No	No*
SIGAR Audit-10-09, <i>ANA Garrison at Kunduz Does Not Meet All Quality and Oversight Requirements; Serious Soil Issues Need to Be Addressed</i> , April 30, 2010	No	No
SIGAR Audit 10-10, <i>ANA Garrison at Gamberi Appears Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Need to Be Addressed</i> , April 30, 2010	Yes	No*
SIGAR Audit 10-12, <i>ANP Compound at Kandahar Generally Met Contract Terms but Has Project Planning, Oversight, and Sustainability Issues</i> , July 22, 2010	Yes	No
SIGAR Audit 10-14, <i>ANA Garrison at Farah Appeared Well Built Overall but Some Construction Issues Should Be Addressed</i> , July 30, 2010	No	Yes

<i>SIGAR Audit 11-03, ANP District Headquarters Facilities in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces Have Significant Deficiencies Due to Lack of Oversight and Poor Contractor Performance, October 27, 2010</i>		
Garm Ser Afghan National Police (ANP) District Headquarters	No	No
Nad Ali ANP District Headquarters	No	Yes
Nahri Saraj ANP District Headquarters	No	Yes
Spin Boldak ANP District Headquarters	No	No
Takha Pul ANP District Headquarters	No	No
Zeheli ANP District Headquarters	No	No
<i>SIGAR Audit 11-09, ANA Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat Generally Met Construction Requirements, but Contractor Oversight Should Be Strengthened, April 25, 2011</i>		
Afghan National Army (ANA) Facilities at Mazar-e-Sharif: Camp Shaheen	Yes	Yes
ANA Facilities at Herat: Camp Zafar	Yes	Yes
<i>SIGAR Inspection-12-1, Construction Deficiencies at Afghan Border Police Bases Put \$19 Million Investment at Risk, July 30, 2012</i>		
Lal Por 1	No	Yes
Lal Por 2	No	No
Nayzan Base	No	Yes
<i>SIGAR Audit 12-02, Better Planning and Oversight Could Have Reduced Construction Delays and Costs at the Kabul Military Training Center, October 26, 2011</i>		
	No	Yes
<i>SIGAR Audit 12-03, Afghan National Security University Has Experienced Cost Growth and Schedule Delays, and Contract Administration Needs Improvement, October 26, 2011</i>		
	Yes	No
<i>SIGAR Inspection 13-1, Kunduz ANA Garrison: Army Corps of Engineers Released Dyncorp of All Contractual Obligations Despite Poor Performance and Structural Failures, October 25, 2012</i>		
	No	Yes
<i>SIGAR Inspection 13-2, Wardak Province National Police Training Center: Contract Requirements Generally Met, but Deficiencies and Maintenance Issues Need to Be Addressed, October 30, 2012</i>		
	Yes	Yes
<i>SIGAR Inspection 13-3, Gamberi Afghan National Army Garrison: Site Grading and Infrastructure Maintenance Problems Put Facilities at Risk, October 30, 2012</i>		
	No	Yes
<i>SIGAR Inspection-13-4, Kunduz Afghan National Police Provincial Headquarters: After Construction Delays and Cost Increases, Concerns Remain About the Facility's Usability and Sustainability, January 24, 2013</i>		
	Yes	No
<i>SIGAR Inspection-13-5, Iman Sahib Border Police Company Headquarters in Kunduz Province: \$7.3 Million Facility Sits Largely Unused, January 29, 2013</i>		
	Yes	Yes

SIGAR Inspection 13-6, <i>Afghan National Police Main Road Security Company, Kunduz Province, Is Behind Schedule, And May Not Be Sustainable</i> , April 17, 2013	No	No*
SIGAR Inspection 13-7, <i>Qala-i-Muslim Medical Clinic: Serving The Community Well, But Construction Quality Could Not Be Fully Assessed</i> , April 17, 2013	Yes	Yes
SIGAR Inspection 13-8, <i>Forward Operating Base Salerno: Inadequate Planning Resulted in \$5 Million Spent for Unused Incinerators and the Continued Use of Potentially Hazardous Open-Air Burn Pit Operations</i> , April 25, 2013	Yes	No
SIGAR Inspection 13-10, <i>Bathkhak School: Unauthorized Contract Design Changes and Poor Construction Could Compromise Structural Integrity</i> , July 24, 2013	No	No*
SIGAR Inspection 14-5-IP, <i>Archi District Police Headquarters: Extensive Mold, Lack of Running Water, and Inoperable Electrical Systems Show Facilities Are Not Being Sustained</i> , October 20, 2013	Yes	Yes
SIGAR 14-10-IP, <i>Walayatti Medical Clinic: Facility Was Not Constructed According to Design Specifications and Has Never Been Used</i> , October 30, 2013	No	No
SIGAR 14-13-IP, <i>Forward Operating Base Sharana: Poor Planning and Construction Resulted in \$5.4 Million Spent for Inoperable Incinerators and Continued Use of Open-Air Burn Pits</i> , December 16, 2013	No	No
SIGAR 14-31-IP, <i>Salang Hospital: Lack of Water and Power Severely Limits Hospital Services, and Major Construction Deficiencies Raise Safety Concerns</i> , January 29, 2014	No	Yes
SIGAR 14-41-IP, <i>Camp Monitor: Most Construction Appears to Have Met Contract Requirements, but It Is Unclear if Facility is Being Used as Intended</i> , March 12, 2014	No	No
SIGAR 14-81-IP, <i>Shindand Airbase: Use of Open-Air Burn Pit Violated Department of Defense Regulations</i> , July 14, 2014	Yes	Yes
SIGAR 14-82-IP, <i>Gereshk Cold and Dry Storage Facility: Quality of Construction Appears To Be Good, but The Facility Has Not Been Used to Date</i> , July 16, 2014	Yes	No
SIGAR 15-25-IP, <i>ANA Camp Commando Phase II: Power Plant and Fuel Point Not Fully Operational Nearly Two Years After Project Completion</i> , January 6, 2015	No	Yes
SIGAR 15-27-IP, <i>Afghan Special Police Training Center's Dry Fire Range: Poor Contractor Performance and Poor Government Oversight Led to Project Failure</i> , January 13, 2015	No	Yes
SIGAR 15-51-IP, <i>Afghan National Army Slaughterhouse: Stalled Construction Project Was Terminated After \$1.25 Million Spent</i> , April 20, 2015	No	No

SIGAR 15-74-IP, \$14.7 Million Warehouse Facility at Kandahar Airfield: <i>Construction Delays Prevented Facility From Being Used as Intended, July 15, 2015</i>	Yes	No
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Source: SIGAR analysis of inspection reports through September 2015

* These facilities were not being used because they were still under construction within their originally scheduled completion date.

APPENDIX IV - COMMENTS FROM U.S. FORCES-AFGHANISTAN



HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

DCGS/USFOR-A

March 7, 2016

Mr. John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
1550 Crystal Drive, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Sopko:

Reference: SIGAR I-30 Draft Report; Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).


Thank you for providing USFOR-A with the opportunity to review the SIGAR draft report titled, "Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015."

USFOR-A is a staunch supporter of the transparency enterprise, and serves as an active partner in advancing this endeavor. The value of this report lies in consolidating lessons which may benefit organizations charged with construction efforts in similar environments. However, this selection of projects is not a random sampling from among the hundreds of construction projects executed, but rather a selection of projects with shared issues. Additionally, readers should note this report does not represent new research, but re-publishes earlier reports going back as far as six (6) years without an associated update. USFOR-A and its partners have made significant progress on the cited discrepancies since the original reports were published.

We appreciate SIGAR's mission to advance the cause of good stewardship and effective use of American funds. The men and women of USFOR-A remain committed to continuous improvement and advancing our partnership with SIGAR in this shared effort.

The point of contact for this action is Colonel Darren D. Sprunk, at email [REDACTED] or by DSN [REDACTED].

Sincerely,


Jeffrey L. Bannister
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Commander, Support
United States Forces-Afghanistan

APPENDIX V - COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
TRANSATLANTIC DIVISION
201 PRINCE FREDERICK DRIVE
WINCHESTER, VIRGINIA 22602-4373

03 MAR 2016

Mr. John F. Sopko
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction
1550 Crystal Drive, Suite 900
Arlington, VA 22202

Dear Mr. Sopko:

The United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) Transatlantic Division is providing this response to the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Draft Audit Report, "Department of Defense Reconstruction Projects: Summary of SIGAR Inspection Reports Issued from July 2009 through September 2015."

This report has no new recommendations. However, according to SIGAR, nine recommendations remain open, four belonging to USACE. Upon further discussion with SIGAR, it has been acknowledged that there are no open recommendations with USACE.

USACE appreciates SIGAR's acknowledgement of the challenges posed by the combined negative impacts of the high threat security environment and the forces drawdown on sustaining continuous construction surveillance and quality control. We appreciate your remarks that we promptly responded to 90 percent of the deficiencies noted in the 27 USACE reports addressed. However, in our opinion, the 27 USACE projects summarized in this report are not a representative sample of the over 1,200 projects that USACE has executed over the past 12 years in Afghanistan. We also concur that the life safety issues discovered were troublesome. We remain firmly committed to continuously improving our approach to construction quality assurance.

Finally, regarding the Afghan National Army (ANA) Slaughterhouse Project, we note that only 10 percent of construction progress was complete at the time the project was terminated for convenience.

My point of contact for this response is Mr. Mike Hatchett, Internal Review Auditor who can be reached by e-mail at [REDACTED] or via phone at [REDACTED]

Sincerely,

Christopher A. Hussin

Christopher A. Hussin
Colonel, U.S. Army
Chief of Staff

APPENDIX VI - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Daniel Domke, Senior Inspections Manager

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Nicole Stauch, Program Analyst

Madeline Krahn, Student Trainee

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SIGAR-I-030.

SIGAR's Mission

The mission of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance oversight of programs for the reconstruction of Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to:

- improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction strategy and its component programs;
- improve management and accountability over funds administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their contractors;
- improve contracting and contract management processes;
- prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- advance U.S. interests in reconstructing Afghanistan.

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- Phone DSN Afghanistan: 318-237-3912 ext. 7303
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